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A patent licensee that declares bankruptcy will often want to assign its rights under the 
license to another party in exchange for much-needed cash.  The Bankruptcy Code generally allows 
debtors to assign executory contracts, including patent licenses, in this way.  Indeed, the Code 
permits debtors to assign a contract even if the contract itself contains a “no-assign” clause, i.e., a 
clause expressly forbidding assignment.   But there is an exception:  The Code will defer to certain 
kinds of otherwise applicable non-bankruptcy law that would normally prevent the contract from 
being assigned.  In particular, the Code will not allow assignment by a debtor-licensee if, outside of 
the bankruptcy context, the applicable non-bankruptcy law would bar assignment regardless of 
whether the contract contained a no-assign clause or not. 
 Two bodies of non-bankruptcy law speak to the assignment of patent licenses.  State 
contract law generally permits assignment unless the license says otherwise, while a longstanding rule 
of federal common law generally bars assignment unless the license says otherwise.  Careful 
reflection on these two rules reveals that the federal common-law rule is the type of non-bankruptcy 
rule the Code will defer to, while the state contract law rule is not.  Thus, if state contract law 
governs questions of patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy, then inside bankruptcy the 
Code will permit assignment by a bankrupt licensee.  On the other hand, if federal common law 
governs those questions outside of bankruptcy, then inside bankruptcy the Code will defer to the 
federal rule, and will prevent the bankrupt licensee from assigning.  Thus, the question of whether a 
bankrupt licensee can assign a patent license containing a no-assign clause reduces to an Erie 
question about which body of law applies to patent license assignability issues outside of bankruptcy. 
 Under the Erie doctrine, whether state contract law or federal common law applies to patent 
license assignability questions outside of bankruptcy depends on one thing only: whether the use of 
state contract law to decide such questions would pose a “significant conflict” with some federal 
policy.  Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., the leading case on this topic, concluded that using state 
law would significantly reduce the value of the federal patent monopoly, thereby significantly 
conflicting with federal patent policy, and that federal common law must therefore apply.  Other 
authors have criticized Everex, most forcefully by arguing that Congress has tacitly indicated that 
there is no federal policy of protecting the value of the patent monopoly against ordinary variations 
in state contract law.  But such arguments ultimately rest on the authors’ particular, and easily 
assailable, interpretation of Congressional silence on the subject of patent licenses. 
The present article offers a more fundamental critique of Everex: Even if we assume, as the 
Everex court did, that protecting the value of the patent monopoly against variations in state contract 
law is a genuine goal of federal policy, Everex still contains a serious flaw.  Everex concluded that 
applying state contract law to patent license assignability questions (not in the bankruptcy context, 
but generally) would significantly undermine the patent monopoly overall, because it would mean 
that, within any bankruptcy, the no-assign clause in a patent license would always be ignored, 
destroying much of the patent’s value. 
 But the court failed to account for the fact that this insult to the patent’s value occurs only 
when the licensee happens to be bankrupt. Outside of the bankruptcy context, the Bankruptcy Code 
does not apply, and no-assign clauses in patent licenses are routinely enforced, whether one is using 
state contract law or federal common law.  Thus, from the perspective of the would-be innovator—
the scientist or R&D director whose behavior the federal patent policy seeks to shape—the ex-ante 
expected value of the patent may not be significantly reduced by the use of state law as opposed to 
federal common law.  In particular, this ex-ante expected value will not be substantially diminished if 
the probability is low that the eventual licensee of the patented invention will end up going bankrupt. Everex ignored 
this empirical element of the Erie analysis—an element that can also be applied in many other, non-
patent, settings.  In short, the Everex court fell into the trap of imagining that the injury to the patent 
monopoly in the general case would be of the same magnitude as the injury to the patent monopoly 
in the case that happened to be before the court that day.  It would not, for the simple reason that 
most patent licensees do not go bankrupt. 
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1I. Introduction. 1
When a technology-intensive company declares bankruptcy, some of the bankruptcy 
estate’s most valuable resources are likely to be the company’s patent licenses. 2 A patent license 
allows the company to use a proprietary technology at some previously agreed royalty rate, and 
if the royalty payments under the license are less than the expected profit one could earn by 
using the patented technology, the license can be a source of significant value for the licensee.  A 
bankrupt licensee will often want to capitalize on its patent licenses by assigning its rights under 
them to the highest bidder in exchange for payment.  This can enable the bankrupt company to 
better reimburse its creditors in a liquidation scenario, and can also facilitate the company’s 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”).
Because so many technology-intensive companies declared bankruptcy in the wake of the 
stock-market dive of 2000, bankruptcy courts in the past several years have seen a significant 
number of cases in which the special legal problems associated with patent licenses loom large.3
The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, at its October 2000 annual meeting, was already 
devoting a major portion of its program to the question of whether Chapter 11 is “a meaningful 
tool for the rehabilitation and restructuring of high-technology companies.”4  The treatment of 
1
 I would like to thank Prof. Barry Adler of New York University School of Law and John DiPaolo of the 
Temple University Partnership Schools, who gave me advice on various drafts of this article.  Crystal 
Glynn of NYU Law School’s Office of Career Services has also earned my thanks, as have Professors 
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Harry First of NYU, who provided useful criticism on an early draft, and Susan 
Hansen, who helped me simplify and clarify the setup of the legal problem.
2 See, e.g., Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & John D. Pirnot, The Intersection of Patent Law and Bankruptcy: What 
Every Practitioner Should Know, DEL. LAW., Winter 2000, at 30 (2000) (“a patent license may be among 
a debtor's most valuable assets”).
3 See David R. Kuney, Intellectual Property Law in Bankruptcy Court: The Search for a More Coherent 
Standard in Dealing with a Debtor’s Right to Assume and Assign Technology Licenses, 9 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 593 (2001) (noting that “the financial debris of the excess exuberance has now fallen into 
the bankruptcy courts . . . .”).
4 See id. (substantial portion of meeting program devoted to this topic).
2patent licenses in bankruptcy has also attracted a fair amount of scholarly attention,5 both 
because of its practical importance in a technology-intensive economy and because there is still 
serious doubt among experts about exactly when a bankrupt licensee should be allowed to assign 
its rights to third parties.
One Code provision suggests that a bankrupt licensee can generally assign its rights 
under a patent license to a third party.  Indeed, this provision of the Code suggests that the 
licensee can assign these rights even if the license itself contains a clause explicitly prohibiting 
assignment (which for the purposes of this discussion we will call a “no-assign clause”).  But 
5
 See Brett W. King, Assuming and Assigning Executory Contracts: A History of Indeterminate 
“Applicable Law,” 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 95 (1996) (discussing a drafting paradox in the Code, relevant to 
patent-license assignability in bankruptcy but not the focus of this paper, caused by the fact that Section 
365(f) explicitly permits a trustee or debtor-in-possession to assign even if it would override “applicable 
law,” while Section 365(c)(1)(A) defers to certain kinds of “applicable law”); Kuney, supra note 3, at 593 
(reviewing in depth the issue of patent-license assignability, concluding that the post-Erie trend in which 
federal courts apply federal common law to the issue has been implemented somewhat blindly and will 
likely be reconsidered by courts, and concluding that the sensible approach is to do away with the blanket 
rule and establish a new rule under which patent licenses are presumed assignable only when assigning 
them would have no material adverse impact on licensor); Aleta A. Mills, Note & Comment, The Impact 
of Bankruptcy on Patent and Copyright Licenses, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 575 (2001) (recommending special 
legislation allowing a debtor-in-possession to assume a non-exclusive patent or copyright license, but 
providing that it cannot assign such a license unless the license itself so specifies); Parsons & Pirnot, 
supra note 2 (discussing patent-license assignment in bankruptcy as part of a practitioner’s survey of 
issues at intersection of patent and bankruptcy law); Marie T. Reilly, The Federal Interest in the Transfer 
of Patent License Rights in Bankruptcy, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 (2000) (applying economic efficiency 
analysis to the policy underlying the “applicable law” exception in Section 365(c)(1)(A) of the Code, 
which covers assignability of patent licenses in bankruptcy); Carole A. Quinn & R. Scott Weide, 
Violation of the Erie Doctrine: Application of a Rule of Federal Common Law to Issues of Patent License 
Transferability, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1121 (1999) (reviewing the issue of patent-license assignability 
in bankruptcy, and concluding that applying federal common law to issues of patent-license assignability 
in bankruptcy violates the Erie doctrine, because no specific federal policy or interest dictates that the 
patentee should be shielded from unwise transfer of rights and because applying state law to the issue 
does not necessarily give a result at odds with the federal rule); Daniel A. Wilson, Note, Patent License 
Assignment: Preemption, Gap Filling, and Default Rules, 77 B.U. L. REV. 895 (1997) (arguing for a 
default rule that patent licenses are freely assignable unless the license itself says otherwise, in discussion 
about both patent-license assignability in bankruptcy and patent-license “assignment” by corporate 
merger of licensee into second company).  See also, Jessica L. Braeger, Note, Antiassignment Clauses, 
Mergers, and the Myth About Federal Preemption of Application of State Contract Law to Patent License 
Agreements, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 639, 652-53 (2002) (in discussion about patent license “assignment” 
through corporate merger of licensee into second company—unrelated to bankruptcy—asserting that Erie 
doctrine requires that state merger law trump federal common law presumption against patent-license 
assignment).
3another provision of the Code—an exception to the first—says that the Code will defer to certain 
kinds of non -bankruptcy law that would ordinarily bar assignment of the license in question 
outside of the bankruptcy context.  If the Code does defer to such non-bankruptcy law, the 
bankrupt licensee will not be allowed to assign. In short, the Code does not provide a simple 
answer.
It is important to note that the Code does not defer to all non-bankruptcy law that would 
ordinarily bar assignment, but only to certain kinds of non-bankruptcy law that would do so.  In 
particular, the Code will not allow a bankrupt licensee to assign if the applicable non-bankruptcy 
law would normally bar assignment whether or not the license contained a no-assign clause.  
This last phrase defines the subset of non-bankruptcy law that the Code will defer to, as shown in 
by Chart 1 below.
Chart 1.  How the Code Treats Assignment of a Patent License
that Contains a Clear No-Assign Clause
Thus, the problem of whether a bankrupt licensee (sometimes referred to here as “the 
debtor”) can assign a patent license containing a no-assign clause reduces to a choice- of-law 
Applicable non-bankruptcy law bars 
assignment only when the license 
itself prohibits assignment.
Applicable non-bankruptcy law bars 
assignment regardless of whether the 
license prohibits assignment.
Code will allow 
assignment by the 
debtor, overriding the 
non-bankruptcy rule
Code will bar 
assignment by the 
debtor, deferring to the 
non-bankruptcy rule.
SITUATION OUTSIDE 
BANKRUPTCY
SITUATION INSIDE 
BANKRUPTCY[Implies]
4problem—a question of which body of law applies to patent license assignability outside of 
bankruptcy.  If the applicable body of non-bankruptcy law is of the sort the Code will defer to 
(the sort described in the shaded box in Chart 1), then the Code will not allow the bankrupt 
licensee to assign.  But if the applicable non-bankruptcy law is not of that sort, the Code’s 
general preference for assignability will prevail, and the debtor will be allowed to assign.
As we will see, when one considers which body of non-bankruptcy law should govern 
issues of patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy, one finds that there are only  two 
candidates: state contract law, and a rule of federal common law developed in the 1850s and 
meant to apply specifically to patent licenses.  In general, state contract law permits the 
assignment of a contract—including a patent license—unless the contract explicitly states 
otherwise.  (This, at least, is a fair simplification to use for the purposes of this discussion.6)  The 
federal common-law rule shifts the presumption in favor of assignability.  That is, federal 
common law prohibits the assignment of a patent license unless the license explicitly states 
otherwise.  Thus, the two bodies of law disagree only in how they treat a license that is silent on 
the question of assignability.  But this turns out to be a very important difference, because it 
means the Bankruptcy Code will defer to one body of law and not the other.  To see this, 
consider Chart 2, which illustrates the difference between the two bodies of law.
6
 The content of state law regarding contract assignability is discussed in greater detail at note 26, infra.  
It is certainly the case that, in most states, the vast majority of contracts are presumed assignable unless 
they say otherwise.  Patent licenses present a difficult case.  The court in Everex—the case whose analysis 
is the subject of this paper—assumed that California state law (which is fairly typical on such issues) 
would have permitted assignment of the license in question had it not contained a no-assign clause.  
Therefore, it makes sense for us, too, to assume that state law favors assignability of patent licenses, for 
the purposes of assessing the logic of Everex.  (Otherwise we will be bogged down in a debate with the 
Everex court about a state-law question that has no definitive answer.)  The relevant language from the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and an explanation of why this language does not fully resolve the 
issue of whether all patent licenses are presumed assignable under state law, can be found at note 26, 
infra.
5License says 
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Chart 2.  Federal common law says a patent license may not be assigned unless the license 
says otherwise, whereas state contract law says a license may be assigned unless the license 
says otherwise.
Chart 2 illustrates the fact that, as between these two bodies of law, only the federal
common-law rule bars assignment whether the license contains a no-assign clause or not.  (I.e., 
the federal rule bars assignment in both the middle column and the right-most column of Chart 
2.)  But this is precisely the precondition that is needed for the Code to bar assignment by a 
bankrupt licensee.  (To see this, look back at Chart 1.)  Thus, if state contract law applies to 
questions of patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy, then inside bankruptcy the Code 
will override that law, and bankrupt licensees will be allowed to assign, even in the face of a 
clear no-assign clause.  On the other hand, if patent license assignability questions outside of 
bankruptcy are governed by federal common law, then inside bankruptcy the Code will defer to 
that non-bankruptcy rule, and bankrupt licensees will not be allowed to assign in the face of a no-
assign clause.  In short, the fate of the debtor-licensee who is saddled with a no-assign clause 
depends entirely on which of these two bodies of law applies to patent license assignability 
questions outside of bankruptcy.
To determine which of these two bodies of law does apply outside of bankruptcy, one 
must use the sort of analysis found in the line of cases following Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.7
These cases, which are a mainstay of any “federal courts” class in law school, describe the 
7
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6limited circumstances under which courts may supplant state law with federal common law.  
Patent license assignability questions, because they are questions of contract interpretation, will 
generally be governed by state contract law unless they are covered by some specific exception 
to Erie’s broad proscription of federal common law.  If an Erie exception does apply, federal 
common law will govern them.  This article will argue that there is just one circuit-court case, 
Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp.,8 that has ever attempted a serious application of the Erie 
doctrine to the problem of determining which body of law applies to questions of patent license 
assignability.
As the Everex court concluded, the most relevant strand in the Erie line of cases would 
permit the use of federal common law to decide such questions only if using state contract law to 
decide them would significantly conflict with some federal policy.  The Everex court had little 
difficulty concluding that using the state law rule would indeed significantly conflict with a 
federal policy, namely federal patent policy.  “Allowing free assignability—or, more accurately, 
allowing states to allow free assignability—of nonexclusive patent licenses, would undermine 
the reward that encourages invention,” the court wrote.9  In other words, if state contract law 
were allowed to control issues of patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy, then, 
whenever a licensee went bankrupt, the Code would allow the licensee to assign, even if the 
license contained a no-assign clause.  For reasons explained in Part II below, overriding a no-
assign clause in this fashion often renders the license far less valuable to the licensor, and thus
seriously diminishes the value of the patent monopoly.  That is why, in the view of the Everex 
court, applying state law to questions of patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy would 
8
 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996).
9 Id. at 679.
7surely “undermine the reward that encourages invention,” due to its baneful effects on the 
patent’s value in situations where the licensee is bankrupt.
This conclusion has not been immune to scholarly critique.  The most fundamental attack 
on Everex, offered by Carole A. Quinn and R. Scott Weide,10 asserts that Congress’s persistent 
failure to amend the Patent Act to include so much as a reference to patent licenses, even in the 
face of numerous court battles over which body of law should govern the assignability of such 
licenses, should be considered a tacit acknowledgment by Congress that there is no federal 
policy of protecting the value of the patent monopoly against ordinary variations in state contract 
law.  But as we will see in Part V, this critique relies heavily on its authors’ assumptions about 
the meaning of Congressional silence, and those assumptions can easily be turned on their heads 
in the absence of factual evidence that is almost certainly unavailable.
This article maintains that arguments such as the one advanced by Quinn & Weide are 
not necessary to discredit the Everex decision, because the Everex decision contains a serious 
logical error even on its own terms—that is, even if one assumes that there is a federal policy of 
maximizing the value of the patent monopoly.  Here is the core of the argument.  Everex found 
that using state contract law to decide questions of patent license assignability would 
significantly undermine federal patent policy by significantly diminishing the economic value of 
the patent.  If state law were to govern questions of patent license assignability, Everex found, 
then bankrupt licensees could always violate the no-assign clauses in their patent licenses, 
thereby robbing the patent holders of significant value.  But in reaching this conclusion the court 
overlooked an important fact about the world—namely, that most licensees do not end up in 
bankruptcy.  The Everex court reasoned that if we were to use state law to decide questions of 
10
 Quinn & Weide, supra note 5.
8patent license assignability, “every licensee” would suddenly be permitted to disregard the no-
assign clause in its patent license, robbing the licensor of his monopoly profits.  But in fact, 
“every licensee” would not be permitted to do this.  Only bankrupt licensees would.  Outside of 
bankruptcy, the use of state law does not frustrate no-assign clauses in the least.  Outside of 
bankruptcy, both state and federal common law lead to the same result:  If a license contains a 
no-assign clause, it may not be assigned.  (To confirm this, look back at the right-most column in 
Chart 2.)  Only in the event of licensee bankruptcy does the use of state law undermine the 
license’s no-assign clause.  And licensee bankruptcy may, in fact, be quite rare.
Certainly, from the perspective of the licensor whose licensee has already declared 
bankruptcy, the use of state law to decide questions of patent license assignability significantly 
reduces the value of the patent.  But that is not the perspective federal patent policy cares about.  
Federal patent policy, by definition, is concerned only with the perspective of the would-be 
innovator, i.e., the scientist in her laboratory trying to decide how much effort to put into her 
next research project.  From this person’s perspective, the use of state law to decide questions of 
patent license assignability might not significantly diminish the expected value of the patent.  It 
all depends on the ex-ante expected probability that the innovator’s future licensee will go 
bankrupt.  Only if the expected probability of licensee bankruptcy is fairly high will the use of 
state contract law significantly impair the ex-ante expected value of the patent, and thus the 
incentive to innovate.
If a court wishes to opine on whether the use of state law to decide issues of patent 
license assignability “significantly” reduces the patent’s value from the ex-ante perspective, that 
court must necessarily weigh in on the ex-ante probability that a patent licensee will go bankrupt, 
which is a purely empirical question.  The Everex court never took a position on the probability 
9of licensee bankruptcy, indeed never even mentioned that it might be relevant.  And Everex’s 
scholarly critics have likewise ignored this most glaring shortcoming of the court’s opinion.  The 
point of this article is not to argue that the Everex court’s conclusion was necessarily wrong, but 
to show that one cannot possibly know whether it was wrong or not, without some notion of the 
probability of licensee bankruptcy.  This observation should be uncontroversial, and yet it has 
somehow eluded both the Everex court and its critics.
* * * * * * * * *
Part II of this article explains why patent licensors often have compelling economic 
reasons for wanting to insure that their  licenses are not assigned.  As a result, many licenses do 
contain no-assign clauses.  Part III discusses Sections 365(f)(1) and 365(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Section 365(f)(1) gives a bankrupt licensee the right to assign its license to a third party in 
most cases, even when the license contains a clear no-assign clause.  Section 365(c) creates an 
exception to that rule in certain circumstances (as shown in the gray box in Chart 1).  Based on 
these two provisions of the Code, Part III will show that if state contract law applies to questions 
of patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy, then inside bankruptcy the debtor-licensee 
will be allowed to assign, but if federal common law applies to those questions, the debtor-
licensee will not be allowed to assign.  Thus, whether or not a bankrupt licensee may assign boils 
down to an Erie analysis.
Part IV describes the two federal circuit cases that have attempted this Erie analysis, and 
concludes that only one of them, Everex, supplies an intelligible argument that future courts 
might be tempted to follow.  Part V reviews the two main critiques of Everex in the existing 
10
literature, and shows that one of them, even if correct, would be confined to the facts of Everex 
and would not undermine its basic legal conclusion, while the other relies on its authors’ 
subjective, and eminently assailable, imputation of meaning to Congressional silence.
Part VI argues for a more robust critique of Everex: the fact that the Everex court failed to 
take a position on the probability of licensee bankruptcy.  The need for an empirical, 
probabilistic Erie analysis, which the Everex court overlooked, is not an entirely new idea.  In 
fact, the Supreme Court made this same point, in a totally different context, in Robertson v. 
Wegmann.11  This case is also discussed in Part VI, and its similarities to Everex are noted.  Part 
VII anticipates, and rejects, a few reasons why one might doubt this article’s main conclusion.  
(Part VII is somewhat technical and can be skipped, or skimmed, on a first reading of this
article.)  Finally, Part VIII sketches out the sort of analysis the Everex court should have used, 
and that future courts might employ when confronted with similar questions.  Part VIII also 
observes that the basic argument of this article can be applied to other Erie problems having 
nothing to do with patents or patent licenses.  In particular, it can be used in any case where the 
federal government has set up a regulatory or statutory scheme designed to give people 
incentives to behave in a certain fashion, and where the use of state law can dampen the federally 
created incentives, but would dampen them incentives only in a particular set of circumstances.  
Critically, for this article’s logic to apply, the person who is the target of the federal incentive 
must, at the moment of his decision, be unable to predict whether he will fall into one of the
incentive-dampening circumstances or not.
11
 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
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II. The question of patent license assignability in bankruptcy is one of considerable 
economic importance, and its practical effects go beyond the bankruptcy context.
Before plunging into the legal analysis, we should first try to understand the practical 
context in which it arises.  The licensing of patents is a common occurrence.  Some businesses 
are good at coming up with new technologies, while others excel at applying those technologies 
in the marketplace.  Rather than forcing every patentee to sell the fruits of its own research, the 
law allows innovators to license their proprietary technologies to the companies that will best 
employ them.
Clearly, a patent license can be made explicitly assignable by its terms, can explicitly 
forbid assignment, or can be silent on the issue of assignability.  This latter possibility—
contractual silence—raises interesting questions, but it will not be our primary focus here, 
because the licenses that cover the most valuable technologies are usually drafted by expert 
patent lawyers who are unlikely to overlook the important issue of assignability. 12 We are left, 
then, with those licenses that are explicitly assignable, and those that contain a “no-assign” 
clause—a clause prohibiting assignment.  If a patent license is assignable by its terms, the legal 
problem at the heart of this article disappears.  Licenses that are explicitly assignable outside of 
bankruptcy remain assignable under the Code, and the thorny questions raised by Section 365 
never arise.  But in fact, firms that license their patented technologies often prefer that the 
licenses not be assignable, and therefore many valuable patent licenses contain no-assign clauses.  
This occurs for two reasons.
First, when a license is non-exclusive—i.e., when the licensor retains the right to license 
its technology to other licensees—the licensor will often want to assure that the technology 
12 Section VII.C briefly considers how the analysis of this paper might be extended to include licenses 
that are silent on the question of assignability.
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cannot be assigned so that it can protect its own ability to charge high royalties to subsequent 
licensees.  If the first licensee could freely assign its rights to others, then anyone else wishing to 
use the technology could purchase it from either the licensor or the first licensee.  By playing the
two off against each other, someone interested in the technology would likely be able to 
negotiate a lower royalty rate than he could have gotten had he been negotiating with the patent 
holder alone.13  Second, whether or not a license is exclusive, the licensor will often insist on a 
no-assign clause to protect its competitive advantage.  A patent-holder frequently uses its 
patented technology to achieve an advantage in its own industry, and it may be willing to license 
the technology only to firms in other industries, secure in the knowledge that they could not 
possibly use the technology to compete in the licensor’s home market.14 Without a no-assign 
clause, the licensee could turn around and assign the license to the licensor’s main competitor, 
destroying the licensor’s competitive advantage.15  For both of the above reasons, a significant 
number of patent licenses contain no-assign clauses, and those are the licenses we will be most 
concerned with in this article .16
13 See, e.g., Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that if one 
allows a non-exclusive patent license to be assignable, then “a party seeking to use the patented invention 
could either seek a license from the patent holder or seek an assignment of an existing patent license from 
a licensee.  In essence, every licensee would become a potential competitor with the licensor-patent 
holder in the market for licenses under the patent[].”).
14
 For instance, if engineers a DaimlerChrysler developed a way of improving the durability of headlights, 
it might be willing to license the technology to a maker of bathroom lighting fixtures but not willing to 
license it to General Motors.
15
 This is essentially what occurred in Unarco Industries, Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (1972).  See 
also Mills, supra note 5, at 580 (“When the debtor is a licensee of a nonexclusive patent or copyright 
license, the licensor’s central concern is that the license may be transferred to a competitor or some other 
entity that the licensor would not have contracted with.”).
16
 Even if a license is nominally “non-assignable,” if its value to some third-party firm is sufficiently high, 
the licensee can try to “assign” the license to that firm, by engaging in a corporate takeover:  The third-
party firm can simply merge with, or purchase, the licensee.  This is what occurred in the case of PPG 
Industries v. Guardian Industries, 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979).  Of course, this sort of “assignment by 
merger” will happen only in extreme cases.  See Braeger, supra note 5, for a discussion of corporate 
takeovers of this type.
13
Having described the economic context in which issues of patent license assignability 
arise, we should also note that the treatment of such issues by bankruptcy courts has practical 
consequences far beyond the bankruptcy context.  Suppose, for example, that courts interpret the 
Code to permit assignment by bankrupt licensees.  In that case, whenever a would-be licensor 
and licensee are negotiating the terms of a license, the licensor will demand higher royalty 
payments to compensate it for the risk that the licensee might someday declare bankruptcy and 
thereby gain the right to assign the license.  It is as if the licensor is forced to sell the licensee a 
kind of “bankruptcy insurance,” by awarding the licensee the valuable right to assign only in 
those instances when the licensee has declared bankruptcy.  At the time the license is signed, if 
the two parties think the chance of an eventual bankruptcy is high, then the licensor will charge a
high premium for this bankruptcy insurance (i.e., high royalty payments), and a license that 
would otherwise have been signed might be rendered jointly disadvantageous to the two parties, 
such that no deal can be struck at any price. On the other hand, if licensee bankruptcy appears 
very unlikely (or if it appears that the harm to the licensor from the licensee’s assignment of its 
patent rights would be slight), then the licensee will pay only a small premium for its 
“bankruptcy insurance,” and the overall effect on economic efficiency will be negligible.17  The 
point is this:  The expected probability of licensee bankruptcy will affect the royalty rates paid by 
all licensees, even the ones who never end up in bankruptcy, just as a person’s expected 
17
 One might think that, like any other kind of insurance against a risk where the risky behavior itself can 
yield some benefit to the insured party, this indirect form of bankruptcy insurance could create some 
“moral hazard.”  Specifically, it might give licensees an incentive to take more business risks prior to 
bankruptcy.  The licensee’s shareholders would enjoy the increased expected returns that resulted from 
the business risks, and would be partly insured when those risks resulted in large losses and the company 
was forced into bankruptcy.  But in fact, this sort of moral hazard would be negligible, because the 
benefits of the bankruptcy insurance would be enjoyed mainly by the licensee’s creditors, not by the 
shareholders who had controlled the firm’s investment decisions prior to bankruptcy.
I thank John DiPaolo, of the Temple University Partnership Schools, for pointing out that the 
insurance metaphor was better than the lottery metaphor used in earlier drafts.
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probability of contracting emphysema will affect his health insurance premiums even if he never 
ends up getting the disease.  So, the treatment of patent licenses in bankruptcy is not just a 
“bankruptcy issue.”  Its economic effects spill over into the non-bankruptcy world.
15
III. Whether a bankrupt licensee may assign despite a no-assign clause depends entirely 
on whether questions of patent license assignability are governed by state contract 
law or federal common law, outside of the bankruptcy context.
The statutory analysis of whether patent licenses are assignable by a bankrupt licensee 
begins with Sections 365(a) and 365(f)(1) of the Code.  These sections provide that, in a 
bankruptcy, the debtor may assign all of its executory contracts, including patent licenses, even 
when those contracts contain clear no-assign clauses.  This is accomplished in two parts.  First, 
Section 365(a) says that the trustee or debtor-in-possession “may assume or reject any executory 
contract . . . of the debtor.”18  (In this article, for the sake of simplicity, I will speak of the 
“debtor” being the one who assumes or assigns a contract, even though it is technically the 
trustee or debtor-in-possession that does this.)  When a contract is assumed under Section 365(a), 
the debtor and any other parties to the contract continue to be bound by it just as if no bankruptcy 
had occurred.19 Another provision of the Code, Section 365(f)(1), says that 
[e]xcept as provided in . . . [Section 365(c)], notwithstanding a provision in an 
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that 
prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract . . . , the trustee 
[or debtor-in-possession] may assign [any contract it has assumed under Section 
365(a)] . . . .”20
Those unfamiliar with the Code may find this surprising.  A bankrupt company not only has the 
right to continue its contractual relationship on the terms it enjoyed before declaring bankruptcy.  
18
 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
19
 The debtor may even assume a contract it has breached, so long as it promptly cures any defaults and 
gives “adequate assurance” that it will perform on the contract in the future.  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).
20
 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1). See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2) (trustee may assign executory contract only if he 
assumes it in accordance with § 365). 
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It may also assign its contract rights and obligations to the highest bidder, even if the contract 
itself explicitly prohibits assignment.  This heavy-handed rule has been explained as a way of 
allowing debtors to “monetize” their valuable contract rights, so that creditors can recover more 
of what they are owed and debtors have a better chance at a successful reorganization.21
As we saw in Part I, the Code contains an important exception to this rule of ignoring no-
assign clauses in contracts.  Section 365(c) says that if some otherwise applicable body of non-
bankruptcy law would bar assignment of a contract outside of bankruptcy—and would bar such 
assignment regardless of whether the contract contained a no-assign clause or not—then the 
Code will defer to this body of non-bankruptcy law.  In other words, in such cases the Code will 
bar assignment of the contract by the debtor, whether the contract contains a no-assign clause or 
not, just as the non-bankruptcy law would have done.22  (See Chart 1 above for an illustration of 
the type of non-bankruptcy law that the Code will defer to.)
21 See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 5, at 3 (“Under nonbankruptcy law, whether the licensor can block a 
proposed transfer of patent license rights depends on the terms of the license. . . .  Bankruptcy law, 
however, specifically invalidates restrictions or prohibitions on transfer in order to maximize the value of 
the rights for the benefit of the estate.”); Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Limitations on Assumption and 
Assignment of Executory Contracts by “Applicable Law,” 31 N.M. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (2001) (noting 
that courts, as well as most debtors and creditors, prefer reorganization to liquidation, and that the Code 
must give the debtor the ability to control the disposition of its pre-bankruptcy contracts to help assure a 
successful reorganization).  Whatever public policy gloss we may wish to give it, the rule wiping out no-
assign provisions in contracts when a party goes bankrupt amounts to a statutory transfer of wealth from 
one contract party to the other, activated only by the latter’s bankruptcy.  Essentially, every contract that 
contains a no-assign clause has built into it a “bankruptcy insurance” policy of the sort discussed in Part 
II.
22
 By its terms, Section 365(f)(1) overrides no-assign clauses only “[e]xcept as provided in . . . [Section 
365(c)] . . . .”  Section 365(c) reads as follows:
§ 365.  Executory contracts and unexpired leases
. . .
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired 
lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment 
of rights or delegation of duties, if —
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such 
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to 
17
The idea behind Section 25(c) is subtle, but sensible. If the applicable non-bankruptcy
law would bar assignment only when the contract contained a no-assign clause, then it would 
merely be enforcing the language of the contract.  If the Code were to defer to such non-
bankruptcy law, bankrupt licensees could always point to state contract law, which virtually 
always enforces no-assign clauses, as an applicable body of non-bankruptcy law barring 
assignment.  Then the Code would be forced to bar assignment in virtually every case, and the 
exception would have swallowed the rule.  This is why the Code cannot defer to non-bankruptcy 
law that merely enforces contractual no-assign clauses.23  On the other hand, if the applicable 
body of non-bankruptcy law would bar assignment regardless of whether the contract contained
an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such 
contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; 
and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 365(c).  Note the repetition of the clause “whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or 
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties.”  The second appearance of this clause, in § 
365(c)(1)(A), indicates that the Code will defer only to applicable non-Code law that bars assignment in a 
contract-blind way—i.e., bars it whether or not the contract contains a no-assign clause.
Section 365 is a confusingly drafted provision, and the discussion of it in the main text above has 
intentionally ignored certain still-unsettled debates about precisely what it means, because those debates 
would take us far from the main topic of this paper, and are not essential to the arguments presented here.  
In particular, there are still doubts about (i) whether the words “assume or assign” in the first line of § 
365(c) literally mean that whenever the trustee or debtor-in-possession would be prohibited from 
assigning an executory contract under this provision he would also be prohibited from assuming that 
contract; and (ii) the different meanings of the term “applicable law” as it is used in § 365(c)(1)(A) and § 
365(f)(1), respectively.  See, e.g., King, supra note 5; Kuney, supra note 3; Mills, supra note 5; Pulley 
Radwan, supra note 21; Reilly, supra note 5.
23 See Reilly, supra note 5, at 22 (noting that the second “whether or not” clause in Section 365(c) 
excludes from “applicable law” rules of contract interpretation that disallow assignment simply because 
the parties explicitly chose to disallow assignment).
In fact, the question of whether state contract law should even be a candidate for “applicable law” 
under § 365(c) presents a difficult problem in statutory interpretation.  Two definitions of “applicable 
law” have arisen concerning this part of the Bankruptcy Code, in opinions of the first and sixth federal 
circuits, and under both definitions one could argue both that state common law should count, and that it 
should not count, as “applicable law.”  This paper does not address this additional difficulty, but simply 
deals with those cases where, as in Everex, state common law is found to constitute “applicable law” for § 
365(c) purposes.
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a no-assign clause, then whoever wrote this law (Congress, the state legislature, etc.) must have 
done so for overarching policy reasons, beyond the mere desire to enforce private agreements.  
This is the sort of non-bankruptcy law the Code will defer to .  Thus, the Code defers to “policy-
based” non-bankruptcy rules that bar assignment, but not to rules that bar assignment merely to 
enforce privately negotiated no-assign clauses.  (See Chart 1 above.)
Once one understands this aspect of Section 365(c), it becomes clear that the central 
practical question of this article —whether a no-assign clause will be enforced, or ignored, in 
bankruptcy—can only be answered by looking to the body of non-bankruptcy law that ordinarily
applies to questions of patent license assignability.  In fact, there are just two candidates.  First 
there is state contract law, the body of law that governs questions of contract assignability 
generally and almost all other aspects of patent license construction.24  Second, as we saw in Part 
I, there is a very old rule of federal common law, which was designed specifically to supplant 
state contract law on questions concerning the assignability of patent licenses.25
24 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1969) (construction of a licensing agreement on a 
technology that was under review by the Patent and Trademark Office when the agreement was signed, 
and that was later covered by a patent, “solely a matter of state law . . . .”); Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 
U.S. 496 (1926) (noting general rule that suit by patentee for any remedy in respect of contract permitting 
use of patent is not a suit under the U.S. patent laws); Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp, 89 F.3d 673, 
677 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The construction of a patent license is generally a matter of state contract law . . . 
except where state law ‘would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy’”) (quoting Lear, 395 
U.S. at 673); McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether express or 
implied, a license is a contract ‘governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.’”) (quoting Power 
Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); Power Lift, Inc. v. 
Weatherford Nipple-Up Systems, Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A license agreement is a 
contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law”); Reilly, supra note 5, at 13 (“Since Erie v. 
Tompkins, courts have treated construction of patent licenses as matter of state contract law, except where 
state law would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy.”).
25 See Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing the recent 
history of the federal rule); Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. 193, 216 (1852) (setting forth 
the rule 151 years ago); Bowers v. Lake Superior Lake Superior Contracting & Dredging Co., 149 F. 983, 
986 (1906) (“A license to use a patented invention that does not contain words importing assignability is a 
grant of a mere personal right to the licensee which does not pass to his heirs or representatives and which 
cannot be transferred to another without the expressed consent of the licensor.”); Reilly, supra note 5 at 4 
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For the moment, let us not worry about which of these two bodies of law actually applies 
to questions of patent license assignability.  The answer is unclear. Instead, let us do a thought 
experiment, and consider both possibilities.  Here is a second copy of Chart 2, as a reminder of 
the content of state law and federal common law concerning patent license assignability:
License says 
“licensee may 
assign”
License is silent 
on assignability
License says 
“licensee may not 
assign”
State law rule assignment 
permitted
assignment 
permitted
assignment not
permitted
Federal 
common-law 
rule
assignment 
permitted
assignment not
permitted
assignment not
permitted
Chart 2 (second copy).  Federal common law says a patent license may not be assigned 
unless the license says otherwise, whereas state contract law says a license may be assigned 
unless the license says otherwise.
First, imagine a world in which questions of patent license assignability are governed by 
state contract law.  In such a world, what will happen when a bankrupt licensee asks the 
bankruptcy court for permission to assign its license, notwithstanding a no-assign clause?  The 
first thing the judge will do is look to the Code, where she will find Section 365(f)(1), setting 
forth the general rule that the debtor may assign the license, regardless of the no-assign clause.  
But the judge will also have to consider Section 365(c), which carves out an exception to the pro -
assignability rule of Section 365(f)(1).  As we have seen, this exception applies only where 
applicable non-bankruptcy law would bar assignment regardless of whether the license contains 
a no-assign clause or not.  Here, by assumption, “applicable law” is state contract law, and in 
most states, contract law principles would bar assignment if the license contained a no-assign 
(“Courts have developed a federal common law default rule that governs the transferability of patent 
license rights”).
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clause but would permit assignment if the license did not, just as shown in Chart 2 above.  In 
other words, state law construes contractual silence in favor of assignability.26 Thus, it cannot be 
said that the applicable non-bankruptcy law bars assignment regardless of whether the license
contains a no-assign clause, because, in fact, state law gives different results depending on
whether the license contains a no-assign clause or not. I.e., in Chart 2, state law bars assignment 
in the right-most column but permits assignment in the middle column. Therefore, the condition 
26
 The Everex court presumed that state contract law would allow assignment of a patent license that does 
not contain a no-assign clause.  In fact, as David Kuney has suggested, see notes 50-53, infra, a better 
analysis of state law might have led to the conclusion that the license at issue in Everex should have been 
presumed non-assignable.  It is difficult to say how state courts would generally treat the issue of patent 
license assignability under state law, largely because patent license assignability has typically been 
controlled by federal common law—partly in response to opinions like Everex, which this paper argues 
may have been wrongly decided.  In any case, we know that at least one state supreme court, that of 
California, did reach the issue under state law, and did conclude that the license in question should be 
presumed assignable.  Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 223-24 (Cal. 1957).  For 
the purposes of this paper, we assume only that the Dopplmaier decision was not aberrant.  I.e., we 
assume that there will be some significant number of patent licenses that typical state law doctrine would 
presume to be assignable absent any contractual language to the contrary.  As we will see, the Everex 
decision would apply to those licenses—whether or not the particular license at issue in the Everex case 
was properly considered one of them.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 317(2) provides that contractual rights (such as 
the right to use a patented technology) can generally be assigned where such assignment is not precluded 
by the contract, except in situations where transferring the rights from assignor to assignee “would 
materially change the duty of the obligor, or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on him by his 
contract . . . or materially reduce its value to him . . . .”  As Marie T. Reilly points out, this language begs 
the question of what happens under state law when the assignment of a license would result in the very 
same stream of royalties to the licensor, but where the assignee might, for example, compete with the 
licensor in the market for patent licenses, thus depriving the licensor of some of profit she would 
otherwise have enjoyed by selling additional licenses on more favorable terms.  Does the loss of 
bargaining power on a completely separate license with a third party “materially reduce the value” of the 
first license to the licensor?  See Reilly, supra note 5, at 8 (“In particular, [the Restatement] does not 
directly address whether an objecting party is entitled to enjoin transfer in order to capture an opportunity 
to profit,” as opposed to an outright loss.)
The Dopplmaier court found that the relevant patent license should be presumed assignable under 
state law, but cited the somewhat different standard of the first Restatement: whether the assignment 
“would materially impair the nonassigning party’s chance of obtaining the performance he expected.”  
Perhaps the change of language between the first and second Restatements reflects some shift in the law 
of most states, and perhaps the Dopplmaier court would interpreted California state law differently had it 
heard the case in 1997 rather than 1957.  In any case, for the purposes of this paper, we assume that at 
least some state contract doctrines, properly interpreted, give the same result as the Dopplmaier and 
Everex courts reached under California state law.  We will not be able to settle the debate over whether 
those courts both misread California law.
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of Section 365(c) is not met.  Section 365(f)(1) controls, and the Code will permit the debtor to 
assign.27
As the second step in our thought experiment, imagine a world in which questions of 
patent-license assignability are governed by federal common law, as shown in the bottom row of 
Chart 2.  A line of federal court opinions dating back to 1852 established this judge-made rule, 
which applies exclusively to patent licenses.  The rule states that unlike most other contracts, 
patent licenses should be presumed to be non-assignable, absent some explicit contractual 
language to the contrary.28  Thus, if a bankruptcy court is faced with a patent license that 
contains a no-assign clause, it will be clear to the court that outside of bankruptcy the federal rule 
would have barred assignment of that license with or without the no-assign clause.  In other 
words, one could have scratched out the no-assign clause and it wouldn’t have made any 
difference, since the federal rule would bar assignment in both the right-most and center columns 
of Chart 2. Therefore, the condition of Section 365(c) it met.  The Code will defer to the federal 
rule that applies outside of bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court will not allow the bankrupt 
licensee to assign.29
Our thought experiment is now complete, and the conclusion is clear.  If state common 
law applies to questions of patent license assignability  outside of bankruptcy, then a bankrupt 
27 See Reilly, supra note 5, at 18-22, for a discussion of the fact that whether the Code will defer to a 
certain non-bankruptcy bar on assignability depends entirely on what that non-bankruptcy rule would do 
if the contract were (hypothetically) silent on the issue of assignability.  (The “applicable law” that 
Section 365(c) will defer to, says Reilly, appears to be limited “to only those rules of contract 
interpretation that render particular rights non-transferable if (hypothetically) the express agreement of the 
parties was silent as to transferability.”  Id. at 21-22.)
28 See Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. 193, 216 (1852), and, generally, note 25, supra.
29
 Here, again, we are glossing over a rather complex legal debate for the sake of simplicity.  In reality, 
whether the federal common-law rule qualifies as “applicable law” under § 365(c) depends on how one 
reads that phrase, and a complete analysis would have to consider separately the various possible 
interpretations, especially the two reached by the first and sixth federal circuits.
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licensee may assign its license, notwithstanding a no-assign clause.  But if federal common law 
governs those questions, a bankrupt licensee may not assign, whether the contract contains a no-
assign clause or not.  In other words, whether a bankrupt licensee can assign its patent license 
boils down to a choice-of-law question:  Does state contract law govern questions of patent 
license assignability outside of bankruptcy, or does federal common law govern those questions?
* * * * * * * * *
Before turning to this choice-of-law issue, we should make a brief technical qualification 
to all that follows.  Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code never mentions patent licenses by name.  
Instead, the section speaks of “[e]xecutory contracts and unexpired leases” held by the debtor.30
But the term “executory contract,” as used in the Code, has routinely been construed to include 
non-exclusive patent licenses.31  There is considerable doubt about whether an exclusive license 
30
 11 U.S.C. § 365, title.
31
 In bankruptcy parlance, an “executory contract” is any contract the debtor entered into prior to filing for 
bankruptcy in which some substantial performance was owed by both parties at the time of the filing.  
See, e.g., Griffel v. Murphy (In re Wegner), 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “the meaning 
of [‘executory contract’] in this context is ‘a contract . . . on which performance is due to some extent on 
both sides’ and in which ‘the obligations of both parties are so far unperformed that the failure of either 
party to complete performance would constitute a material breach and thus excuse the performance of the 
other.’”) (citations omitted); Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 460 (1973) (defining executory contracts as ones “under which the obligations of both the 
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete 
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”).  The legislative 
history behind the current § 365 refers approvingly to this definition of an “executory contract,” often 
called the “Countryman definition.”  See S. Rep. 95-989, 1978, p. 58, H.R. Rep. 95-595, 1978, p. 307 
(observing that the term executory contract “generally includes contracts on which performance remains 
due to some extent on both sides.”); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 365.02[1] (Matthew Bender & Co., 
Inc., ed., 15th ed. revised 2002).
Bankruptcy courts have interpreted this definition very broadly, such that it covers most patent 
licenses, and almost certainly covers all non-exclusive licenses.  For instance, the licensor’s duty to take 
legal action against those who infringe the patent (a provision commonly found in patent licenses), 
Kuney, supra note 3, at 598; cf. Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating 
23
would be regarded as an executory contract for the purposes of Section 365.  Particularly if the 
licensor itself had promised to stop using the technology in question , a bankruptcy court might 
find that an exclusive license more closely resembles an outright transfer of the patent32 than an 
executory contract.  In such a case, the patent would be treated as an asset of the debtor, not a 
bundle of contract rights, and Section 365 would not apply.  Accordingly, the present discussion 
can be applied reliably only to non-exclusive patent licenses.
that “it is well settled that a non-exclusive licensee of a patent has no standing to sue for infringement.”), 
and even the licensor’s bare obligation not to sue the licensee for infringement, see Everex Systems, Inc. 
v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that patent license was “executory contract,” 
because licensor owed “significant continuing performance” to licensee, in that licensor “must continue to 
refrain from suing [licensee] for infringement . . . .), will often be held to be sufficiently substantial 
ongoing obligations for the patent license to fall under the Code’s definition of “executory contract.”
32
 Kuney, supra note 3, at 597.
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IV. The most important judicial opinion to consider whether federal common law
applies to questions of patent license assignability is Everex, in which the court 
concluded that federal common law should apply.
A. The Erie doctrine.
We now turn to the choice-of-law question at the core of our legal analysis.  As we noted 
in Part III, in 1852 the Supreme Court created a federal common-law rule, which was meant to 
supplant state contract law on questions of patent license assignability.  In the second half of the 
nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth, federal courts consistently used this rule to 
determine whether patent licenses could be assigned.33  But the scope of federal common law 
generally was dramatically narrowed in 1938, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.34  On its face, Erie seemed to forbid the creation of federal 
common law (i.e., judge-made law), except when the federal courts were interpreting federal 
statutes or the Constitution.35  Thus, federal common-law rules of contract interpretation, such as 
the traditional one pertaining to patent license assignability, should have been nullified by Erie.
But since Erie the Supreme Court has considerably re-expanded the scope of federal 
common law, by carving out a number of exceptions to Erie, and today the exact boundaries of 
33 See, e.g., Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. 193, 216 (1852); Oliver v. Rumford Chemical 
Works, 109 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1883); Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 234 (1886); Lane & Bodley Co. v. 
Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 195-96 (1893) (dictum); Bowers v. Lake Superior Lake Superior Contracting & 
Dredging Co., 149 F. 983, 986 (1906).
34
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35
 This is the literal reading of Erie’s pronouncement that “[t]here is no federal general common law,” 304 
U.S. at 78, and that the enforcement of such law exceeded the constitutionally defined powers of the 
federal courts.  Also in Erie, the Court made clear that there would no longer be two bodies of substantive 
law, one to be applied in state courts, the other in federal courts.  In the much-narrowed sphere where 
federal courts retained the power to create judge-made law after Erie, that law would be binding on state 
and federal courts alike.
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the federal courts’ power to create common law are somewhat murky.36  The specific question of 
whether federal common law should apply to questions of patent license assignability has come 
up in four federal circuit court opinions since Erie, and on all four occasions the circuit courts 
have decided in favor of applying the traditional federal rule.  But these four cases hardly 
establish an overpowering tide of opinion.  First, although bankruptcy courts are federal courts 
and therefore follow federal precedent, it is worth noting that the California State Supreme Court 
has held that in the post-Erie period questions of patent license assignability should be governed 
by state law, not federal common law.37  And of the four federal circuit decisions on the topic, 
only two—Unarco Industries v. Kelley38 and Everex Systems Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp.39—even 
attempted to do an Erie-style analysis of the proper scope of federal common law.  The other two 
opinions, Rock-Ola v. Filben40 and PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries,41 embraced the 
federal common-law rule only in dicta, and justified it by simply citing prior federal cases, 
without discussing whether it made sense to apply the federal common-law rule in the wake of 
Erie.  Among the federal cases cited in Rock-Ola and PPG Industries, the only ones with 
36 See, generally, 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4514, nn.5-38 and accompanying text (2003) (describing existence of myriad 
post-Erie instances of federal common law).
37
 Farmland Irrigation Company, Inc. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 220 (Cal. 1957).  Three of the four 
post-Erie federal circuit cases were decided after Dopplmaier, and there remains the possibility that the 
California Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue today, would find those three federal-court 
decisions persuasive on this question of federal Constitutional law concerning the scope of the federal 
courts’ powers.  But the Dopplmaeier decision is still good law in California, and the fact that its outcome 
differed from that of the federal circuit courts at least gives one reason to believe the issue is a disputed 
one.
38
 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972).
39
 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996).
40
 168 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1948).
41
 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979).  The citing of the federal rule was a dictum because the holding relied 
on an implied non-assignability term that was ostensibly part of the legal contract; no federal rule was 
needed to interpret contractual silence because the contact was not silent.
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controlling authority (i.e., the only U.S. Supreme Court decisions) had been decided prior to Erie
itself, and thus could hardly be expected to embody the post-Erie state of the law.
Let us examine the two more serious post-Erie decisions—Unarco and Everex—in turn.
B. Unarco.
The Unarco court supported its decision to embrace federal common law by citing Sola 
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co.,42 a Supreme Court case decided four years after Erie, in which the 
Court carved out an exception to Erie’s sweeping rejection of federal common law.43 In 
particular, the Unarco court relied on a passage from Sola proclaiming that Erie’s ban on federal 
common law was “‘inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of the 
law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must 
be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than by local 
law.’”44  The Unarco court concluded that questions of patent license assignability did fall into 
this Sola-created exception to Erie, and must therefore be controlled by federal common law.  As 
the Unarco court put it, 
When [a] . . . person . . . desires to license or relinquish any part of the patent 
monopoly, such person is utilizing the monopoly of rights intended by the framers 
of the Constitution and the legislation of Congress to reward invention and 
originality.  This monopoly conferred by federal statute as well as the policy 
perpetuating this monopoly, so affects the licensing of patents, and the policy 
behind such licensing is so intertwined with the sweep of federal statutes, that any 
42
 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
43
 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
44
 Unarco Industries v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (quoting from Sola, 317 U.S. at 174).
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question with respect thereto must be governed by federal law.45
Thus, the Unarco court concluded, “[w]e are of the opinion that the question of assignability of a 
patent license is a specific policy of federal patent law dealing with federal patent law.”46
But this invocation of Sola was clearly misplaced.  Based on the language from Sola
quoted supra at the text accompanying note 44, the Sola Court clearly meant to permit the 
creation of federal common law only in circumstances where a whole “area[] of judicial 
decision” was densely populated by federal statutes directed toward a particular policy goal, so 
that the “legal relations” affected by those statutes need to be controlled by federal law.  But this 
cannot possibly justify the Unarco decision.  Certainly, the law pertaining to the federally 
created patent monopoly is an “area of judicial decision” that could be regarded as “dominated 
by the sweep of federal statutes”—namely, the Patent Act.  But the Unarco decision cannot 
possibly rest on this observation alone.  After all, if we read Sola to mean that all “legal 
relations” affected by the Patent Act must be controlled by federal common law, then federal law 
would have to eclipse state contract law concerning every conceivable issue of patent license 
construction, not merely questions of patent license assignability.  But in fact, courts routinely 
treat almost every aspect of patent license construction as a matter of state, not federal, law. 47
Thus, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals astutely noted 24 years after Unarco, the Unarco 
court’s “conclusion [that the Sola exception requires patent license assignability to be governed 
45 Unarco, 465 F.2d at 1306.
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1143-44 (“The Supreme Court has long held that suits 
brought on a contract in which a patent is the subject-matter, and which generally do not involve the 
validity or construction of a patent, are not cases under the patent laws and are within the jurisdiction of 
the state courts.  In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit routinely 
addresses other issues of contract interpretation with state law.).
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by federal law] seems insupportably broad given the general rule that most questions with 
respect to the construction of patent licenses are governed by state law.”48
C. Everex.
Because the Unarco decision contains this fundamental flaw, we are left with just a 
single circuit court opinion that can be said to have undertaken a meaningful Erie analysis of the 
patent license assignability question.  That opinion came in the Everex case, the 1996 decision in 
which the Ninth Circuit described Unarco’s shortcomings before embarking on its own Erie 
analysis.  Due to its unique status, Everex is likely to serve as the jumping-off point for federal 
courts confronted with patent license assignability questions in the future, which is why it is such 
an important decision.
The facts of Everex precisely mirror the scenario we have been discussing here.  In the 
events leading up to the litigation, a licensee had declared bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee 
wanted to assign the (non-exclusive) license to a third party, even though the license itself clearly 
prohibited assignment.  The court concluded (just as we did in Part III) that the question of 
whether the license could be assigned boiled down to a non-bankruptcy choice-of-law question:  
Outside of bankruptcy, are issues of patent license assignability governed by federal common 
law, or not?  The Everex court’s attempt to answer this question is well-summarized in a single 
paragraph from its decision:
[]  The fundamental policy of the patent system is to “encourag[e] the 
creation and disclosure of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology 
and design” by granting the inventor the reward of “the exclusive right to practice 
48
 Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996).  See also, Kuney, supra note 
3, at 601 (“The notion that ‘any question’ with respect to the assignment of a patent is a matter of federal 
common law [, as suggested by the Unarco court,] is debatable, and likely to be wrong.”)
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the invention for a period of years.”  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989). Allowing free assignability—or, more 
accurately, allowing states to allow free assignability—of nonexclusive patent 
licenses would undermine the reward that encourages invention because a party 
seeking to use the patented invention could either seek a license from the patent 
holder or seek an assignment of an existing patent license from a licensee.  In 
essence, every licensee would become a potential competitor with the licensor-
patent holder in the market for licenses under the patents.  And while the patent 
holder could presumably control the absolute number of licenses in existence 
under a free-assignability regime, it would lose the very important ability to 
control the identity of its licensees.  Thus, any license a patent holder granted—
even to the smallest firm in the product market most remote from its own—would 
be fraught with the danger that the licensee would assign it to the patent holder’s 
most serious competitor, a party whom the patent holder itself might be absolutely 
unwilling to license.
“Thus,” the court concluded, “federal law governs the assignability of patent licenses because of 
the conflict between federal patent policy and state laws, such as California’s, that would allow 
assignability.”49  (The “state law” the court is referring to is California contract law.)  Having 
decided that the federal common-law rule should govern questions of patent license assignability
generally, the Everex court easily concluded that the bankrupt licensee in question should not be 
allowed to assign its license to a third party, because of Section 365(c) of the Code, which defers 
to the federal common-law rule, as we saw in Part III.
49 Everex, 89 F.3d at 679 (emphasis added).
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V. The existing critiques of Everex leave intact much of that case’s vitality, but the 
present argument advances a new critique that goes to the core of the Everex court’s 
reasoning.
The considerable scholarship on the treatment of patent licenses in bankruptcy has 
included several critiques of Everex.  In a 2001 article discussing patent license assignability in 
bankruptcy,50 David R. Kuney points out that the Everex court may have simply gotten the state-
law rule wrong as it applied to the patent license under consideration.  If California contract 
principles would ordinarily have regarded the relevant patent license as being non-assignable 
were it not for the no-assign clause,51 Kuney argues, then the Everex court might have been 
creating an Erie issue where none existed.  As Kuney notes, “the application of the state law of 
assignments might well require that the court look to the nature of the contract and endeavor to 
determine whether the underlying agreement was one where the identity of the parties was 
actually critical to maintaining the benefit of the bargain,”52 rather than simply permitting 
assignment of any contract that is silent on the issue.  Indeed, it is true that California contract 
law does not generally permit the assignment of contract rights when such assignment would 
materially impair the non-assigning party’s chance of getting the performance he expected.53
This can be seen as an exception to the usual rule of reading contractual silence to favor 
assignability.  (In a 1999 article, Carole A. Quinn and R. Scott Weide made a similar point, to 
50
 Kuney, supra note 3.
51
 Recall, to pass the Section 365 test, the applicable law must bar assignment with or without the no-
assign clause.  See Chart 1.
52
 Kuney, supra note 3, at 628.
53 E.g., Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 222 (Cal. 1957).
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Kuney’s, arguing that the Everex court did not carefully consider what outcome would have 
resulted if California state law had been applied to the license at issue.54)
It is true that the Everex court did not sufficiently defend its assumption that California 
state law, applied to the particular license before it,  would follow the pattern show in the “state 
law” row on Chart 2.  The court does speak of “state laws, such as California’s, that would allow 
assignability”55 of the license—which suggests that the court had somehow concluded that 
California law would have followed the “state law” pattern shown in Chart 2, as opposed to the 
“federal law” pattern, when applied to the particular license in question.  The district court below 
had made it clear that it believed the license would be presumed assignable under California law, 
and the Ninth Circuit appears to have accepted this view with little additional analysis.  But the 
district court, in turn, rested its conclusion on the California Supreme Court’s Dopplmaier 
decision, which it said had dictated that “under California law, patent licenses could be freely 
assigned”56—which is clearly an overbroad reading of Dopplmaier.57  But the reason that neither 
the Ninth Circuit nor the district court in Everex considered the issue carefully is that both courts 
ended up concluding that, assuming state law did favor assignability, the federal common-law 
rule would trump state law and the bankrupt licensee could not assign—the very same result as if 
54 See Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1143 (“Neither the Unarco nor Everex court examined what 
outcome would result if the law of the forum state were applied.  Application of state law might have 
resulted in an outcome identical to that arising from application of the federal rule.”).
55
 Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996).
56
 In re CFLC, Inc., 174 B.R. 119 (N.D. Cal., 1994).
57
 In fact, Dopplmaier did not conclude that patent licenses are generally presumed assignable absent a 
no-assign clause.  Rather, Dopplemaier applied the usual California standard described supra at note 53
and the accompanying text, looking at whether assignment would materially impair the non-assigning 
party’s chance of getting the performance he expected, and presuming the license to be assignable only if 
it would not.  Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d at 222-24.
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state law did not favor assignability.58 In short, the fine points of California state law were not 
outcome-determinative given the holding, so the district court and Ninth Circuit did not focus on 
them.
But even if one can quarrel with the application of California state contract law to the 
particular license at issue in Everex, this does nothing to assail Everex’s main result: that in cases 
where state law and federal common law differ on how a patent license should be treated, the 
latter wins out, even in the post-Erie world.  At the very least, we know there are some
circumstances in which state-law doctrines like California’s would follow the pattern of the 
“state law” row in Chart 2.  We know this because, in Dopplmaier itself, the California Supreme 
Court applied California law to a patent license—a license that wa s silent on the question of 
assignability.  And in that case the California Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he assignment 
[of the license in question] did not impair materially [the licensor’s]59 chance of obtaining the 
performance for which [it had] bargained, and therefore it was effective to transfer [the 
licensee’s] rights to” the assignee.60  In other words, the California Supreme Court applied 
ordinary state contract law to a patent license that was silent on the issue of assignability, and 
concluded that this silence should be construed in favor of the proposed assignment—the very 
definition of the “state law” row in Chart 2.
In the future, whenever such a case arises—i.e, a case where state law would favor 
assignability of a patent license in the face of contractual silence—courts will presumably 
override state law, and enforce the opposite result, due to the Everex decision.  And therefore, 
58 See In re CFLC, Inc., 174 B.R. at 124 (“[t]he bankruptcy court properly applied a longstanding rule of 
federal law . . . ”).
59
 Technically, the court was speaking of the assignee of the licensor here.  But the difference is 
unimportant for our purposes.
60
 Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 223-24 (Cal. 1957).
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whenever a bankrupt licensee tries to assign a patent license that contains a clear no-assign 
clause, such assignment will be forbidden under Section 365(c) of the Code, even when that 
license, absent its no-assign clause, would be assignable under ordinary state law.  Thus Kuney’s 
critique of Everex—because it is limited to the particulars of how the Everex court applied 
California state law to the license at issue—does not undermine the future influence of the 
Everex opinion.  It is at best a fact-specific critique.
In their 1999 article, Quinn & Weide61 launched a second assault on Everex.  They 
pointed out that in 1952, when Congress voted the Patent Act into law, 62 it must have been aware
of the various decisions concerning patent license assignability, yet it chose not to address patent 
licenses directly anywhere in the Act.63 Indeed, even after 1957, when the California Supreme 
Court, in Dopplmaier, held that state contract law governs issues of patent license assignability 
after Erie,64 Congress failed to revise the Patent Act to overrule Dopplmaier.  Quinn & Weide 
interpret this persistent inaction by Congress as evidence that there is no Everex-style “federal 
policy” urging us to protect the value of the patent monopoly in all cases.65  If there were such a 
61 See Quinn & Weide, supra note 5.
62 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.
63 See Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1142-43 (“. . . while Congress was aware of the various decisions 
regarding patent license transferability when it enacted 35 U.S.C. § 261 in the 1952 Patent Act, it did not 
amend this section to clarify the rights of a licensee.”).  It is clear from the context that Quinn & Weide 
mean that Congress did not “amend” the various pre-enactment drafts to clarify this issue.  See also 
Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d at 220, noting that “[patent] [l]icenses have no [federal] statutory basis . . . .”
64 See Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d at 220 (“If any federal interest exists, it is too remote and speculative to 
justify displacing state law.  We conclude, therefore, that we are free to make our own determination 
whether the assignability of a license contract requires express consent in the contract.”) (citation 
omitted).
65 See Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1142 (noting that “[t]he fact that the particular rights at issue are 
government granted “exclusive” rights does not support a finding that there must be a federal policy 
which serves to always protect the rights,” and invoking Congressional inaction as evidence to support 
this).
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federal policy, Quinn & Weide reason, Congress would surely have written protections for patent 
licenses into the Patent Act.
But the very same history can be invoked to support the opposite conclusion.  When 
Congress enacted the Patent Act in 1952, it could have pointed to a century’s worth of federal 
decisions holding that the federal common-law rule, and not state law, applied to patent license 
assignments.66  And if there was any doubt about whether the federal rule had survived Erie, the 
1952 Congress could have easily looked to the, post-Erie, 1948 Eighth Circuit decision in Rock-
Ola v. Filben,67 which had re-asserted the federal rule in the wake of Erie (though, as noted 
above, the relevant language had appeared in dicta68).  In other words, to the extent that the 1952 
Congress held any belief at all about the law on patent license assignability, it was probably that 
such matters were already governed by federal common law.  Thus, Congress’s failure to 
mention patent licenses in the Patent Act might be taken as a sign that it approved of the 
traditional, federal common-law, treatment of those licenses.
And what of Congress’s failure to overrule Dopplmaeir?  This, too, admits to a different 
reading than Quinn & Weide’s.  On both occasions when Congress was revising the relevant 
section of the Patent Act,69 in 1975 and again in 1982,70 it already would have known about the 
1972 decision in Unarco, clearly stating (and not in dicta this time) that federal common law 
controlled questions of patent license assignability, even post-Erie.  Here, again, one can 
interpret Congress’s inaction as tacit approval of the use of federal common law, rather than as 
66
 The federal common law rule was created in 1852 in Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. 
193 (1852), and had been repeatedly invoked by federal courts since that time.
67
 168 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1948).
68 See id. (noting that the license at issue explicitly forbade the assignment in question).
69
 The obvious section in which to overrule Dopplmaier is Section 261 of the Patent Act, which is entitled 
“Ownership; assignment.”
70
 Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1143.
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tacit disapproval, as urged by Quinn & Weide.  Ultimately, this game of divining meaning from 
Congressional silence leads, at best, to a stalemate.71
* * * * * * * * *
This article distinguishes itself from these previous efforts to attack Everex, in that it 
meets the Everex opinion on its own terms.  Here, we do not quarrel with the Everex court’s skill 
in applying California state contract law to the license before it, nor do we take issue with the 
court’s assertion that there is a federal policy favoring the preservation of the value of the patent 
monopoly, at least to some degree. Here, we assume that the patent license at issue in Everex 
would have been presumed assignable under California law—i.e., would have followed the 
“state law” pattern on Chart 2.  And we take Everex at its word that “[t]he fundamental policy of 
the patent system is to ‘encourag[e] the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and non-obvious 
advances in technology and design’ by granting the inventor the reward of ‘the exclusive right to 
practice the invention for a number of years,’”72 and that this implies some federal interest in 
maintaining the economic value of the patent monopoly.
But even if one grants the Everex court these core assumptions, its opinion is still 
susceptible to attack.  And it is this effort to attack Everex on its own terms that is the main 
project of this article.  As we will see in the next section, Everex’s own logic does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that federal common law should control questions of patent license 
71
 A similar critique can be made of Jessica Braeger’s 2002 Note in the Drake Law Review, asserting that 
“[i]f Congress meant to preempt state contract law as it applies to patent license agreements with § 261, it 
would have done so more directly.”  Braeger, supra note 5, at 652-53.
72
 Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting from Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
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assignability post-Erie.  To properly draw that conclusion, the Everex court would have had to 
first find that licensee bankruptcy was, empirically, a high-probability event.  And neither Everex 
nor its previous critics have even acknowledged that such an empirical finding was relevant.
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VI. The Everex court found a significant conflict between federal patent policy and the 
use of state contract law only by assuming, incorrectly, that every patent license in 
the United States ends up in the hands of a licensee that goes bankrupt.
A. The Everex court’s core error: its failure to consider the probability of 
licensee bankruptcy.
Because the Erie decision was a Supreme Court edict against the creation of federal 
common law, lower courts can endorse the use of federal common law only by pointing to an 
exception to Erie carved out by the Supreme Court itself.  The Everex court relied on a different 
exception to Erie than the Sola-created exception cited in Unarco (and discussed in Section IV.B
above).  The exception invoked by Everex is one that permits the use of federal common law in 
cases where following state law would significantly conflict with some federal policy.  To 
establish that exception, the Everex court cited the Supreme Court case of Lear v. Adkins.73
From Lear, the Everex court drew the proposition that “[t]he construction of a patent license is 
generally a matter of state contract law [], except where state law ‘would be inconsistent with the 
aims of federal patent policy,’ [].”74  The Everex court then used this “federal policy” exception 
to Erie to justify adopting the federal common-law rule for questions of patent license 
assignability.
Let us examine Lear for a moment, to better understand the Erie exception invoked by 
the Everex court.  In Lear, the Supreme Court was asked to decide how a certain patent license 
should be construed.  “The decisive question,” the Court said, was “whether overriding federal 
policies would be significantly frustrated” if state contract law were applied.75  By invoking 
Lear, the Everex court revealed that it was relying on the Erie exception invoked in Lear —the 
73
 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
74 Everex, 89 F.3d at 677 (parenthetical, citations to Lear, 395 U.S. at 661-62 & 673, and additional 
citations, omitted).
75 Lear, 395 U.S. at 673.
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one allowing the use of federal common law when applying state law would significantly 
conflict with some federal policy.  As we saw in Section IV.C, the Everex court ended up 
concluding that federal common law must govern the assignability of patent licenses, “because 
of the conflict between federal patent policy and state laws, such as California’s, that would 
allow assignability.”76
At the time of the Everex decision, this same exception to Erie had been restated by the 
Supreme Court in at least two cases following Lear.  In O’Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, a decision also noted with approval in Everex, the Supreme Court 
explained that exceptions to the Erie doctrine are “limited to situations where there is a 
‘significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.’”77
Similarly, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, the Supreme Court explained that 
federal judges may create federal common law when “a ‘significant conflict’ exists between an 
identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law . . . .”78
Having reviewed the relevant Supreme Court cases, we can now state the logic of Everex 
more precisely.  Everex concluded that applying state contract law to questions of patent license 
assignability would “undermine the reward that encourages invention,” thus “significantly 
conflicting” with federal patent policy.  And because of Supreme Court cases such as Lear, 
O’Melveny and Boyle, we know that, when the use of state law would significantly conflict with 
federal policy, it is proper to supplant state law with federal common law.  On its face, then, the 
76 Everex, 89 F.3d at 679.
77
 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
78
 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).  In fact, only O’Melveny is a perfect analog to Lear.  Boyle did apply the 
“significant conflict” standard, but the Court first determined that the relevant area of law (that of military 
contracting) was one of “uniquely federal interest.”  Therefore, the “significant conflict” did not have to 
be as significant as it would otherwise have needed to be, to permit the use of federal common law.  Id. at 
507-08.
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Everex decision appears to be a perfectly reasonable implementation of the “significant-conflict-
with-a-federal-policy” exception to Erie.  But a closer look reveals an important elision in the 
Everex court’s reasoning—one that might have led the court to the wrong result.
The Everex court is saying that if we were to allow state common law to control, many 
states would (as California has done) impose a rule favoring assignability—i.e., one following 
the “state law” pattern in Chart 2.  And because of the details of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, this would mean that a bankrupt licensee could assign its license to a third party, even 
when the license contained a clear no-assign clause.  Undermining no-assign clauses in this way 
surely does reduce the value of the patent monopoly to its holder—or, as the Everex court put it, 
“undermine[s] the reward that encourages invention.”  Therefore, it significantly conflicts with 
federal policy, and must not be permitted.
But this logic, straightforward as it seems, overlooks an important fact of life—namely, 
that most patent licensees do not wind up in bankruptcy.  To decide that federal common law 
should govern questions of patent license assignability, the Everex court first had to conclude 
that the use of state law would significantly frustrate federal patent policy.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court noted that great harm would be inflicted on the patent monopoly if state
law were used, because bankrupt licensees would be able to ignore no-assign clauses in their 
licenses.  But the court failed to account for the fact that many patent licensees do not go 
bankrupt, and in all of those cases state law gives the very same result as the federal common-
law rule.  Outside the special context of bankruptcy, the Code does not apply, and there is no 
need for the complex dance of Section 365.  Outside bankruptcy, whether one is using state law 
or federal common law, the no-assign clause is honored and the licensor is not harmed in the 
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least.  (To see this, notice that the right-hand column of Chart 2 says “assignment not permitted” 
under both the federal and state rules.)
When a court calculates how badly the use of state law would impair the incentive to 
innovate, it must view the problem from the perspective of the would-be innovator: the inventor 
sitting in his laboratory (or, perhaps more realistically, the R&D director sitting in her office), 
trying to decide how much effort, time, or money to invest in a certain research project.  This 
decision is made long before the invention is complete, long before the patent is issued, and 
certainly long before the inventor learns whether the eventual licensee of that patent will end up 
going bankrupt.  From the ex-ante perspective of the innovator, the chances may be small that 
the licensee will ever declare bankruptcy.  And from the innovator’s point of view, it will only be 
in these rare cases that the no-assign clause will be undermined by state law.  This small chance 
of having the no-assign clause undermined might not reduce the ex-ante expected value of the 
patent monopoly by very much at all, because it counts for little in the calculation of the overall 
average expected future value of the patent.  If licensee bankruptcy is very unlikely, then the 
innovator’s incentive to innovate would scarcely be affected by this very improbable cataclysm.
It is as if the innovator is being promised the keys to a Rolls Royce if he discovers a 
useful, new and non-obvious technology, and Section 365 of the Code is imposing a one-in-a-
thousand chance that the Rolls Royce he wins will be a lemon.  This small chance of winding up 
with a worthless Rolls Royce will scarcely dampen the innovator’s incentive to work hard at his 
research, because there is still a 999-in-a-thousand chance that the Rolls Royce will be an 
extremely valuable “non-lemon.”
The Everex court appears to have gotten distracted by the fact that the particular licensee 
before it happened to be in bankruptcy.  When the court inquired into how seriously the 
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application of state law would frustrate federal patent policy, it behaved as if state law would 
routinely frustrate no-assign clauses in patent licenses.  In the court’s words, “Allowing free 
assignability  . . . would undermine the reward that encourages invention because . . . [i]n 
essence every licensee would become a potential competitor . . .  in the market for licenses . . . .”
But this is plainly false.  It is not “every licensee” that can freely assign his license to a third 
party:  It is only bankrupt licensees who can do so.  Non-bankrupt licensees must obey the no-
assign clause under both the state and federal rules.  And the would-be innovator must surely 
factor these “good outcomes” into her calculation of the ex-ante expected value of the patent.
As an example, suppose that exactly 1% of the nation’s patent licenses are granted to 
licensees destined to wind up in bankruptcy.79  In that case, even if undermining a license’s no-
assign clause literally reduced its value to the licensor to zero (which, of course, it does not), it 
would still be the case that applying state contract law as opposed to federal common law could 
not possibly reduce the ex-ante value of a patent by more than one part in a hundred.80
What’s more, if our hypothetical assumption is correct—i.e., if only 1% of the nation’s 
licensees wind up in bankruptcy—then the Everex court may be subjecting the remaining 99% of 
79
 A more complete analysis would have to look not simply at the fraction of the licenses whose licensees 
declared bankruptcy, but rather at the value-weighted fraction of licenses whose licensees did so.  For 
instance, if 1/3 of licenses wound up in bankruptcy, but all of them turned out to be licenses for nearly 
worthless technologies, then the would-be innovator might not particularly care.  Having one’s no-assign 
clause stripped away by the courts only smarts if the underlying technology has real value.
80
 This statement is only approximately accurate.  In fact, while the expected value of the patent cannot 
decline by more than one part in 100, the actual value of the patent to the innovator can decline by 
slightly more than that.  Generally speaking, risk-averse people are not willing to pay an asset’s expected 
value to acquire the asset, if the risk of the asset is non-diversifiable, because the people will insist on 
some discount for the hardship of bearing the risk itself.  For instance, a gamble that promises a payoff of 
$2 half the time, and $0 the other half, is worth less than $1, due to the cost of uncertainty itself (and 
perhaps also due to the declining marginal utility of money).  This idea is fundamental to finance theory.  
If the expected probability of bankruptcy is small, however, this correction for the cost of risk-bearing 
will be small as well, and the statement above, that “applying state contract law rather than federal 
common law could not possibly reduce the ex-ante value of a patent by more than one part in 100,” will 
be approximately correct.
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the licensees to federal common law, thus stripping state legislatures and state courts of their 
Erie-vouchsafed powers, merely to avoid a bad result in that one-in-a-hundred case where the 
licensee happens to go bankrupt.  This would be a startling example of the tail wagging the dog.  
The point of this article is not to claim that only 1% ( . . . or 2%, or 7%) of the nation’s patent 
licensees wind up in bankruptcy.  Your author does not know the actual figure.  The point is 
simply to assert that the Everex court made no finding at all on this critical empirical question.  
Had it looked into the matter, and concluded that only a small fraction of patent licensees go 
bankrupt, the court’s decision might well have gone the other way, even using the very same 
legal analysis.
Another way of viewing the problem is to start with the Coase Theorem, which tells us 
that a licensee and licensor will choose the contractual terms that maximize the total economic 
value of the patent at the time the license is signed.  If they choose to put a no-assign clause in
the license, it is likely because a non-assignable license preserves more of the patent’s total 
economic value than an assignable one would have done.  Therefore, any rule of law that 
nullifies no-assign clauses (provided that these clauses arise out of free and well-informed 
bargaining) reduces the total economic value of the patent.81  By nullifying the no-assign clause 
when the licensee is in bankruptcy, the use of state law therefore clearly reduces the patent’s ex-
81
 As discussed in Part II, such a rule amounts to a requirement that the licensor must sell the licensee a 
kind of “bankruptcy insurance” along with the license.  A non-assignable patent license that becomes 
assignable only in the case of licensee bankruptcy is equivalent to a purely non-assignable license plus an 
insurance policy in which the licensor pays the licensee a large sum only if the licensee happens to go 
bankrupt.  The cost of this “insurance” will be built into the fee structure of the patent license.  Clearly, 
there may be some moral hazard problems with such an insurance policy, and even if such insurance were 
desirable there is no reason to believe the patent licensee is well-positioned to bear the associated risk (as 
opposed to, say, an insurance company or other financial institution that can diversify it).  Thus, the rule 
that a no-assign clause is nullified in the case of licensee bankruptcy distorts the market for patent 
licenses, away from the terms that would result from unconstrained bargaining.
43
ante value.  What the Everex court failed to consider is that it might reduce the patent’s value 
only very slightly, not “significantly,” because licensee bankruptcy may, in fact, be quite rare.
B. The U.S. Supreme Court has made the same argument in another context: 
Robertson v. Wegmann.
A close analog to the above argument can be found in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the 1978 case of Robertson v. Wegmann.82  There, a plaintiff had sued a state district attorney 
and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his federal civil rights had been violated under 
color of state law.  Section 1983 specifically requires that courts use the statutes of the forum 
state to fill legal gaps in the federally created private right of action for civil-rights violations, 
except where such state laws are “incon sistent with the Constitution and laws” of the United 
States.83  In such cases, by implication, federal common law must be used.  Thus, the standard 
for when to apply federal common law in Section 1983 actions differs slightly from the Everex-
invoked standard calling for a “significant conflict” between state law and federal policy.  Still, 
in Robertson v. Wegmann, the Supreme Court explained that in looking for “inconsistencies” 
between state and federal law, “courts must look not only at particular federal statutes [], but also 
at ‘the policies expressed in [them].’”84  “Of particular importance,” said the Court, “is whether 
application of state law ‘would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying . . .’” Section 
1983.85  Thus, the test actually used by the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann ends up 
being quite similar to the “significant-conflict-with-a-federal-policy” test used in Everex.
In Robertson v. Wegmann, the Section 1983 suit had been brought in a Louisiana state 
court.  The plaintiff had died before the planned trial, and the executor of his estate had 
82 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
83 Id. at 587.
84 Id. at 590 (citation omitted).
85 Id. (citation omitted).
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attempted to continue his civil-rights action on the estate’s behalf.  But Louisiana’s survivorship 
statute would allow the suit to go forward only if it was brought on behalf of the plaintiff’s 
spouse, children, parents or siblings, and no such relatives existed.  Thus, the federal cause of 
action would have abated with the plaintiff’s death, unless the federal courts were allowed to 
impose a federal common-law rule providing that a Section 1983 action survives in favor of the 
plaintiff’s estate.86
The Court acknowledged that the federal “policies underlying § 1983 include 
compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of 
power by those acting under color of state law.”87  But in the end, the Court found that the 
Louisiana survivorship law, not federal common law, should control, because use of the state
statute did not frustrate these policies seriously enough to warrant the use of federal common 
law.  “[G]iven that most Louisiana actions survive the plaintiff’s death,” the Court wrote, 
the fact that a particular action might abate surely would not adversely affect § 
1983’s role in preventing official illegality . . . .  A state official contemplating 
illegal activity must always be prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action 
being filed against him.  In light of this prospect, even an official aware of the 
intricacies of Louisiana survivorship law would hardly be influenced in his 
behavior by its provisions.88
The analogy with Everex is clear.  Due to the Louisiana state survivorship rule, a small 
number of valid civil-rights actions would die with the plaintiff, whereas under federal common 
law they would have survived him.  The case before the Court in Robertson v. Wegmann 
86 Id. at 588.
87 Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
88 Id. at 592.
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happened to be one of these rare cases.89 Thus, it is beyond dispute that the Louisiana statute 
reduces the average cost of committing a civil rights violation under color of state law, from the 
perspective of the would-be violator.  But, as the Robertson v. Wegmann Court observed, 
because very few plaintiffs will die before trial leaving behind neither spouse, child, parent nor 
sibling, the cost of committing such a civil-rights violation—from the ex-ante perspective of the 
would-be civil-rights violator—will decline only slightly due to the use of the Louisiana rule.  
Therefore, in the Court’s words, “even an official aware of the intricacies of Louisiana 
survivorship law would hardly be influenced in his behavior” by the use of the state rule.
This article has made the same basic argument regarding Everex.  The use of state law to 
decide questions of patent license assignability does, indeed, reduce the value of the patent 
monopoly when the licensee is bankrupt.  But if licensee bankruptcy is relatively rare, then the 
incentive to innovate, from the ex-ante perspective of the would-be innovator, would hardly be 
dampened at all by the use of state law, just as the incentives of the would- be civil rights violator 
would have scarcely been affected by the use of the Louisiana survivorship rule in Robertson v. 
Wegmann.  Unlike the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann, the Ninth Circuit in Everex 
failed to address the critical empirical issue of how frequently the situation arises in which state 
law conflicts with the relevant federal policy.
89
 “Happened to be” is perhaps too glib.  It is often the doctrinally problematic case, not the typical one, 
which makes it to court—especially to the federal appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.  This is 
one reason why courts must guard against presuming that the facts before them are representative, as the 
Ninth Circuit seems to have done in Everex.
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VII. The most powerful critiques of the argument being advanced in this article turn out, 
on closer inspection, not to detract from its main thesis.
Built into the logic of this article are some assumptions about the Erie exception that was 
invoked by the Everex court, and about how the court applied that exception to the facts before 
it.  In this Part VII, we anticipate three particular concerns readers might have regarding these 
assumptions, and show that they do not undermine this article’s main argument.  This Part covers 
ideas that are sometimes subtle, and it can be skipped on a first reading.  Its main purpose is to 
address questions that might arise in the minds of some readers.
A. The “significant conflict” test imposes a meaningful quantitative threshold 
on the severity of the conflict with federal law.
This article has argued that the Everex court’s critical error was failing to consider the 
probability of licensee bankruptcy.  If this probability is low, then perhaps the use of state law to 
decide questions of patent license assignability does not “significantly conflict” with federal 
policy, even though it may conflict to some small degree.  One might reasonably wonder
whether this argument fixates unduly on the word “significant” in the Erie line of cases.  Can we 
really defend the notion that a conflict between state law and federal policy must surpass some 
quantitative threshold—that it be “significant”—before courts can cure the problem by imposing 
federal common law?  In fact, we can.
First, in the Supreme Court’s statements of the legal standard, the word “significant” is 
always used.  In Lear, the Court held that “[t]he decisive question” is “whether overriding 
federal policies would be significantly frustrated” by the use of state law, and in O’Melveny and 
Boyle the Court explained that federal common law was permitted when there was a “significant 
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conflict” between federal policy and the use of state law.90 Other authors have explicitly 
recognized the quantitative nature of the “significant conflict” standard.  Quinn & Weide have 
noted that “even assuming a conflict between state law and [the relevant] federal policy were to 
exist [in the Everex case], the conflict must be significant in order to justify displacement of state 
law.”91
The ascription of real meaning to the word “significant” in the Supreme Court doctrine
can also be defended on the grounds of common sense.  The Erie decision created a strong 
presumption against the use of federal common law, and the Supreme Court has “emphasized 
that federal common law can displace state law in ‘few and restricted’ instances.”92  If courts 
were unwilling to tolerate even a small conflict between federal policy and the use of state law, 
they would find themselves displacing essentially all state laws with federal common law.  For 
any given state-law doctrine, one can always dream up an unlikely set of events that would 
render the state doctrine inimical to federal policy.  But if such events are extremely unlikely, it 
cannot be said that the use of state law significantly frustrates federal policy overall; so there is 
no need to unseat state authority.
The Supreme Court has also, on occasion, explicitly acknowledged the quantitative 
threshold that characterizes the “significant conflict” test.  In Boyle the Court explained that in an 
area of “uniquely federal interest” (in this case, military contracting) the Court would still require 
a “significant conflict” before imposing federal common law, but noted that “[t]he conflict [of 
state law] with federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must exist for [the sort of] . . . 
90 Supra notes 77 & 78 and accompanying text.
91
 Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1143.
92 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 518 (1988) (quoting from Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 
647, 651 (1963)).
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pre-emption” used in Everex.93  In other words, in areas of uniquely federal interest, the conflict 
with federal policy need not reach as high a “level” as in Everex-type cases, before triggering the 
use of federal common law94—a logic that implicitly acknowledges some quantitative threshold.  
Similarly, in 1992 a federal district court applying the same standard used in Boyle found that the 
use of state law “does not present a sufficiently significant conflict between federal and state 
law” to justify the use of federal common law,95 another implicit recognition that not just any 
conflict will do.  Thus, the “significant conflict” standard invoked by the Everex court does 
impose a meaningful floor on the severity of the conflict.  In particular, if licensee bankruptcy is 
sufficiently unlikely, the conflict created by the Code’s nullification of no-assign clauses may not 
be significant enough to warrant the use of federal common law.
93 Id. at 507.
94
 In the case of Chapman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 911 F. 2d 267, 269 (1990), the Ninth Circuit 
itself acknowledged that Boyle called for a reduced threshold for a “significant conflict.”  (“[Appellant] 
vigorously contends, however, that even given the lesser degree of conflict required for preemption in 
areas of uniquely federal interest, the limitation of liability policy expressed in the Act does not pose a 
‘significant conflict,’ [] with the operation of state law . . . .” (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507)).
95
 Illinois Psychiatric Hospital Co. v. Health Care Services Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9607, *7.  The 
Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in O’Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 512 U.S. 79 
(1994), which was cited by the Everex court for its “significant conflict” standard, also invokes the 
quantitative threshold, albeit indirectly.  In O’Melveny the Court had to decide whether a state-law rule 
imputing to a corporation the knowledge of its officers, even if the officers were acting against the 
corporation’s interests, should be overridden by federal common law.  (Using the state rule would have 
estopped the FDIC from suing a law firm for professional negligence in its work for a failed savings-and-
loan.)  Among other things, the Court considered one party’s assertion that federal common law should 
apply to all questions of imputing officers’ knowledge to corporations when the officers are acting against 
the corporation’s interests.  O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 83.  But the Court easily concludes that such a broad 
use of federal common law would be “plainly wrong.”  “[T]he remote possibility that that corporations 
may go into federal receivership,” the Court wrote, “is no conceivable basis for adopting a special federal 
common-law rule divesting States of authority over the entire law of imputation.”  Id. Here, as in 
Robertson v. Wegmann, the Court refuses to impose federal common law on a wide swath of cases, when 
the use of state law would harm the relevant federal interest in only a small fraction of those cases.
O’Melveny illustrates how the main point of this paper can be viewed as an argument for the 
“narrow tailoring” of federal common law rules:  If a court is going to supplant state law with federal 
common law, it must do so in a universe of cases which is narrow enough that, when considered over the 
whole range of these cases, the application of state law would “significantly” impair a federal policy.
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B. The Everex court relied on a significant conflict with actual California 
contract law, not with a hypothetical law that California might someday 
enact.
We should also briefly address a potential misreading of Everex that might, if it were 
correct, undermine the argument of this article.  The Everex court found that “[a]llowing free 
assignability—or, more accurately, allowing states to allow free assignability—of nonexclusive 
patent licenses would undermine the reward that encourages invention . . . .”96  The phrase 
“allowing states to allow free assignability” suggests that perhaps the court was not claiming that 
California state law actually created a significant conflict with federal patent policy, but simply 
that leaving the matter in the hands of the states could conceivably pose such a conflict in the 
future.  To take an extreme example, the California legislature might someday enact a law 
declaring that “all contracts are hereby assignable, regardless of any no-assign clauses they might
contain.”  Such a hypothetical law would, of course, frustrate no-assign clauses in patent 
licenses, not only in cases of licensee bankruptcy, but 100% of the time.  Thus the “significant 
conflict” threshold would clearly be surpassed.97
But there is ample evidence that the Everex court was not referring to such “hypothetical 
state law.” The easiest way to see this is by looking at the language of Everex itself.  The court 
concludes its discussion of whether federal common law should be applied as follows:  “Thus, 
federal law governs the assignability of patent licenses because of the conflict between federal 
patent policy and state laws, such as California’s, that would allow assignability.”98 The phrase 
“such as California’s” strongly suggests that the basis for the court’s decision was the conflict 
96
 Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996),
97
 I thank Prof. Barry Adler of New York University School of Law for pointing out this possible 
alternative reading of Everex, and providing this extreme example.
98 Everex, 89 F.3d at 679.
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with federal policy posed by the actual law of the State of California, not by some hypothetical 
law the state might enact in the future.
A review of the relevant Supreme Court cases shows that, in applying the “significant 
conflict” test, the Court always focuses on the actual law of the forum state, not on hypothetical 
law.  For instance, in Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,99 the court below had found a 
significant conflict between Louisiana state law and the federal policy of promoting the 
assignability of certain mineral leases.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  “However fitting [the 
lower court’s] approach may be where a State interposes unreasonable conditions on 
assignability,” the Court wrote, “it can have no force in this instance because Louisiana
concededly provides a quite feasible route for transferring any mineral lease . . . .”100  Thus, 
while state law could have hypothetically created a significant conflict with the federal policy, 
the use of federal common law was not warranted because the actual law of Louisiana did not 
conflict seriously enough with federal policy to justify such an extreme measure.  The test, then, 
is whether the actual law of the forum state conflicts significantly with a federal policy, not 
whether some future law might do so.  The ostensible conflict found by the Everex court was one 
presented by the actual state contract law of California.  I.e., this article’s reading of Everex has 
been correct.
C. We have been considering only licenses that contain a no-assign clause, but 
even if the Everex court meant to consider all possible patent licenses, the 
shortcomings of its analysis are unchanged.
Our discussion thus far has been based on the notion that the harm to the value of the 
patent monopoly, which the Everex court cited as justifying the use of federal common law, 
occurs only when the license contains a no-assign clause, which is overridden by Section 
99
 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
100 Id. at 69-70.
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365(f)(1) of the Code.  But perhaps Everex can be read more broadly.  Consider what would 
happen if the license we are dealing with is silent on the issue of assignability.  In that case, the 
use of state law (rather than federal law) would result in the patent license being assignable as 
well.  If most patents are worth more when subject to non-assignable licenses, then construing 
these “silent” licenses to be assignable will reduce the expected value of the patent on average.  
The following chart may help clarify this point.
License says “licensee 
may assign”
License is silent on 
assignability
License says “licensee 
may not assign”
Licensee is 
bankrupt
Federal law: 
may assign
State law: 
may assign
Federal law: 
may not assign
State law:
may assign
Federal law:
may not assign
State law:
may assign
Licensee is 
not bankrupt
Federal law: 
may assign
State law:
may assign
Federal law:
may not assign
State law:
may assign
Federal law:
may not assign
State law:
may not assign
Chart 3.  There are three situations (the shaded boxes above) in which the use of state law, 
rather than federal common law, to decide questions of patent license assignability might 
impair the value of the patent monopoly.  We have been paying attention to only one (the 
cross-hatched box).  Here, we consider all three.
In all three of the shaded boxes in Chart 3, the federal rule prohibits assignment while the 
state rule allows it.  Thus, in all three regions, the use of state law will tend to conflict with 
federal patent policy.  In the above discussion, we have focused only on the cross-hatched 
region—the one in which an explicit no-assign clause is overridden by the Code.  Perhaps, 
viewed from the ex-ante perspective of the innovator, the expected harm to the patent’s value 
done by all three of the shaded boxes (each weighted by its probability of occurrence) is enough 
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to make state law “significantly conflict” with federal policy, even though the harm due to the 
cross-hatched box alone does not reach the “significant conflict” threshold.
In fact, there is language in the district court opinion in Everex suggesting that the lower 
court may have had all three shaded boxes in mind.  The district court remarked that “[l]imiting 
assignability to licenses in which the patent holder expressly agrees to assignment aids the patent 
holder in exploiting the patent.”101 This makes it sound as if the district court was considering 
the impact of state law over the whole range of possibilities, including licenses that are silent 
about assignability.
But the Ninth Circuit in Everex seems to have been thinking only of the cross-hatched 
box.  “As a practical matter,” the court wrote,
free assignability of patent licenses might spell the end to paid-up [i.e., flat-fee,] 
licenses. . . .  Few patent holders would be willing to grant a license in return for a 
one-time lump-sum payment, rather than for per-use royalties, if the license could 
be assigned to a completely different company which might make far greater use 
of the patented invention than could the original licensee.”102
This language conveys the distinct impression that the court was thinking of the harm done to 
patent holders who know beforehand that they would like to create a non-assignable license, and 
thus presumably would have inserted a no-assign clause, but who are scared off by the fear that 
the licensee will go bankrupt.
More fundamentally, even if the Ninth Circuit had been thinking of the harm to federal 
policy found in all three shaded boxes of Chart 3, the argument of this article still holds up.  
From the ex-ante perspective, the innovator still must assess the likelihood that the situations 
101 In re CFLC, Inc., 174 B.R. 119, 123 (N.D. Cal., 1994).
102 Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996).
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described by the three shaded boxes will come to pass, in order to figure out the expected value 
of his patent.  But if the Everex court did not even weigh in on the likelihood of the license 
ending up in the cross-hatched box, it certainly did not speculate about the probability of its 
landing in any of the three shaded boxes.  The point remains the same:  The target of the 
incentive—the would-be innovator—must evaluate an array of future scenarios, in only some of 
which the use of state law will reduce the value of the patent.  And the degree to which this 
innovator’s incentive is dampened will depend on the relative probabilities of the patent-value-
reducing scenarios and the patent-value-preserving ones.  The Everex court did not even begin to 
make such an empirical assessment.103
103 Indeed, the addition of the extra two shaded boxes should not substantially affect the outcome of the 
analysis.  In any situation where a patent would be more valuable with a no-assign clause, a licensor will 
“forget” to include a no-assign clause (i.e., will end up in the middle column of Chart 3) only if the 
expected value of the patented technology is very small.
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VIII. What courts should do when faced with Everex-type questions in the future.
Undoubtedly courts will continue to face fact patterns similar to those found in Everex.  It 
is therefore worth considering how these future courts might avoid the pitfalls of the Everex 
court’s reasoning.  Any future court faced with such a problem would likely arrive at the same 
conclusion we ended up with in Part III:  Bankrupt licensees may assign their licenses only if, 
outside of the bankruptcy context, the question of patent license assignability would be governed 
by state law, as opposed to federal common law.  To determine which of these two bodies of law 
applies, the court would have to decide whether there is any applicable exception to Erie’s broad 
proscription on the use of federal common law.  The obvious candidate would be the exception 
described in Everex—the one that allows the use of federal common law when the application of 
state law would “significantly conflict” with some federal policy.  Here, the relevant federal 
policy is federal innovation policy as embodied in the Patent Act.  Its goal is spelled out in 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution: “. . . To promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts . . . ”—i.e., to encourage innovation.  Thus, only when the application of state law would 
significantly frustrate the incentive to innovate can we conclude that state law significantly 
conflicts with federal patent policy.
Reasonable judges will differ about what constitutes a “significant” conflict with the 
federally created incentive to innovate.  One judge might begin by asking, “By what fraction can 
state law reduce the expected value of the patent monopoly before it ‘significantly’ frustrates
innovation?”  Another judge might feel that questions  about how innovative effort responds to a 
particular decrease in the value of the patent monopoly are best left to Congress, not the courts, 
and that any “significant” diminution of the patent’s value significantly conflicts with federal 
policy per se.  But in either case, the judges must commit to some quantitative cutoff.  The court 
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need not settle on any particular number.  It need not, for example, proclaim that “the conflict 
with federal policy is ‘significant’ if the expected value of the patent drops by at least 10% . . . or 
15%, or 20%.”  But even if the cutoff is an impressionistic one, still, a cutoff there must be, 
because if the expected value of the patent is reduced by a small enough fraction, its 
diminishment will not create a “significant conflict” with federal policy.  It will fall short of that
threshold, and will not qualify for the Erie exception.
To determine whether the use of state law would push the patent’s expected value below 
the relevant cutoff, the court must view the problem only from the perspective of the would-be 
innovator.  As the R&D director (for example) decides how much to invest in a research project, 
how does she compute the likely value of the patent that will result from that project?  Suppose 
she estimates that the right to 17 years’ worth of monopoly profits from the technology is 
expected to have a present value of $1 million.  By what fraction will this expected value be 
reduced, if the R&D director knows in advance that, should the licensee go bankrupt, the license 
will become freely assignable, reducing the patent-holder’s future revenue stream?  This is the 
factual question the court must grapple with.
To answer it, the court must consider at least two empirically determined quantities.  
First, there is the quantity we have already discussed: the expected probability of licensee 
bankruptcy.  From the R&D director’s point of view, how likely is it that the licensee of any 
patent developed by the company’s scientists will go bankrupt during the life of the patent?  To 
estimate this probability, the court might look for an average rate of licensee bankruptcy across 
all industries, or (more likely) it might want to use technology-specific bankruptcy rates.  Either 
way, the court would want to draw on expert testimony from economists who study innovation 
and those who study the insolvency rates of various businesses.  Ideally, the court would want its 
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probability of licensee bankruptcy to be weighted by the value of the patent.  If, for some reason, 
licensee bankruptcy occurs mostly in situations where the patented technology is nearly useless, 
then these bankruptcies should not count for much in the overall average, since they only damage
the value of a patent that would not have been worth much anyway.
The second quantity the court must estimate is the expected amount by which the patent’s 
value would change in the event of licensee bankruptcy.  Even in situations where licensee 
bankruptcy is relatively likely, if the patent’s value drops by an average of only, say, 5% when 
the licensee is bankrupt, then the expected value of the patent might not decline very much 
overall.  We have not focused on this second empirical question in this article, mainly because 
the Everex opinion did appear to account for it, albeit informally. (The court seemed to feel that 
the reduction in a patent’s value in cases of licensee bankruptcy would be very large.104)
Of course, the court’s estimates of these two quantities—the probability of licensee 
bankruptcy and the expected decrease in a patent’s value in the event of licensee bankruptcy—
will be subject to the sorts of uncertainties endemic to all social science.  But to ignore these 
empirical questions entirely—to simply assume that 100% of the nation’s licensees wind up in 
bankruptcy, which is essentially what the Everex court did—hardly offers a superior alternative.
As noted in Part I, the empirical approach to estimating these two quantities, which the 
Everex court should have adopted, is not restricted to the patent licensing context.  The point can 
be stated in much more general terms.  Whenever the federal government has established an 
104 Cf., Everex, 89 F.3d at 679, observing that if licenses could be assigned at will, “any license a patent 
holder granted—even to the smallest firm in the product market most remote from its own—would be 
fraught with the danger that the licensee would assign it to the patent holder’s most serious competitor, a 
party whom the patent holder itself might be absolutely unwilling to license.   As a practical matter, free 
assignability of patent licenses might spell the end to paid-up licenses . . . .  Few patent holders would be 
willing to grant a license in return for a one-time lump-sum payment, rather than for per-use royalties, if 
the license could be assigned to a completely different company which might make far greater use of the 
patented invention than could the original licensee.”
57
incentive scheme to encourage or discourage some sort of behavior, and the application of state 
law can blunt the federal reward (or punishment) in a particular subset of cases, the logic of this 
article might apply.  Critically, if the target of the incentive scheme must make the key decision 
(i.e., the decision the incentive scheme is attempting to influence) without himself knowing 
whether he will fall into the category in which the incentive will be blunted, then he can base his 
decision only on probabilities.  He must calculate the probability that he will, in the future, fall 
into the incentive-blunting scenario, multiply it by the average magnitude by which the reward 
(or punishment) is reduced in the incentive-blunting scenario, and adjust his expected federal 
incentive by the resulting amount.105  His ex-ante estimation of his chances of winding up in the
incentive-blunting situation is a critical empirical calculation—one on which he must take a 
position, whether implicit or explicit.  If a court evaluating the problem does not face up to the 
necessity of this calculation, it will have no way to determine the amount by which the federal 
incentive scheme is dampened by the use of state law.  In particular, it will not be able to tell 
whether this amount is “significant,” and will therefore be unable to figure out whether federal 
common law should be applied under the Lear/O’Melveny exception to Erie.
105
 In fact, it may not be as simple as multiplying two numbers.  Most generally, the probability of finding 
oneself in the incentive-blunting subset will be a function of the whole possible array of future scenarios.  
Each combination of variables specifying a given future scenario will bring with it a probability of its 
occurrence, a probability of the decision-maker’s falling into the incentive-blunting category should that 
future occur, and a magnitude by which the incentive would be blunted should the decision-maker fall 
into that category.  Computationally, one would have to integrate over all relevant variables describing all 
possible future states of affairs.  Having thus calculated the ex-ante expected magnitude of the incentive, 
the decision-maker would probably want to correct for the cost of risk-bearing.  E.g., a 50% probability of 
having a federal reward blunted by half does not reduce the reward by precisely 1/4.  It does reduce the 
expected reward by 1/4 (50% of one half), but one also has to correct for the absolute cost of bearing the 
risk.  If the decision-maker is risk-averse, he will prefer an absolute guarantee of a 75% payout to a 50% 
chance of a full payout plus a 50% chance of a one-half payout, even though the two situations give him 
the same expected value.  This extra cost of risk-bearing must be subtracted from any expected reward (or 
added to any expected punishment) to get the decision-maker’s true ex-ante behavioral incentive.
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This highly abstract description of the problem is not merely a fancy way of restating the 
facts of Everex.  It applies to other fact patterns as well.  In particular, as we saw in Section VI.B, 
the Supreme Court case of Robertson v. Wegmann provides a concrete example completely 
outside the patent context.  In that case, the Court was confronted with a federal incentive 
scheme that sought to discourage the violation of civil rights by state officials, by saddling 
violators with civil liability.  Applying state law would have blunted this federally created 
incentive (i.e., reduced the severity of the punishment) in those cases where the victim of the 
civil-rights violation happened to die before trial, leaving no close relatives behind.  Whether 
such an untimely—and lonely—death was going to befall any given victim of a civil-rights 
violation would almost certainly be unknown to the decision-maker (the state official) at the time 
she was deciding whether to commit that violation.  (Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically 
noted that its logic might not work if the state official knew, at the moment of decision, that her 
victim would likely die before trial.106)  Because the state official would not know whether her 
particular victim would fall into the loophole created by Louisiana law, she would be forced to 
play the probabilities.  But the probability of the punishment being dampened by the Louisiana 
survivorship rule was, as an empirical matter, very low:  Very few victims of civil-rights 
violations end up dying before trial with no living spouse, sibling, parent or child.  Hence, there 
106
 As noted above, the decision-maker must, at the moment of decision, be ignorant of whether his case 
will fall into the incentive-blunting category.  The Supreme Court pointed out, in passing, that the 
situation might be different if the civil-rights violation itself had caused the plaintiff’s death.  Robertson v. 
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).  In a footnote on the same page, Justice Marshall again underscores 
the importance of the fact that the decision-maker must be ignorant of whether he will find himself in the 
incentive-dampening situation.  “In order to find even a marginal influence on [the civil-rights violator’s] 
behavior as a result of Louisiana’s survivorship provisions,” Marshall wrote, “one would have to make 
the rather farfetched assumptions that a state official had both the desire and the ability deliberately to 
select as victims [of civil-rights violations] only those persons who would die before conclusion of the § 
1983 suit (for reasons entirely unconnected with the official illegality) and who would not be survived by 
any close relatives.”  Id. at 592 n.10.
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was no “significant” conflict with federal civil-rights policy, and thus no need for federal 
common law.
Given the generalized statement of the problem above, and the particular examples of 
both Everex, in which the Ninth circuit missed the need for an empirical assessment of 
probabilities, and Robertson v. Wegmann, in which the Supreme Court correctly took account of 
that need, one could presumably find other examples in the law—examples of federal incentive 
schemes to which the very same logic would apply.  Unearthing such legal problems, and 
discovering how courts looking at them have treated the probabilistic part of the Erie analysis, 
would make a useful project for future research.
